Much better UK public borrowing gives the Chancellor an extra Budget option

Sometime we find ourselves with the opportunity to look at things from a different perspective and learn from it and this morning is providing that. Let me illustrate with this tweet from @SunChartist.

Are 4.5 year high in Italian bond & 52 week high on Spanish bonds yields bullish Euro? Asking for a friend.

It did not need to draw my attention to the Italian bond market which has been falling again and set new lows for this phase today. In futures terms its BTP December contract is a bit over 118 which means the ten-year yield has reached 3.8%. I forget which investment bank said that between 3,5% and 4% was the point of no return. That is over dramatic in my opinion, but it is what Taylor Swift would call a sign of “trouble,trouble,trouble”.

There is now a hint of contagion as we note that the Spanish bond market is falling today and its equivalent yield is now 1.8%. Context is needed as it is less than half the Italian equivalent and rises were always likely as the ECB scaled back its purchases under its QE programme but a change none the less. However and this is my main opening thrust today there is a small or medium-sized island depending on your perspective which has seen its bonds doing well over the last week or so. It is the UK where the ten-year Gilt yield has fallen from above 1.71% to 1.53%. Again memes can be overdone but looked at in isolation there is a case for suggesting there has perhaps been what is called a flight to quality or a move towards a safe haven. Of course safer haven would be a better description for a market once described as being on a “bed of nitroglycerine” but however you spin it UK Gilts have been in demand.

I have looked at it this way because this week the media have been looking at it in a different way as this from the Financial Times highlights.

Even if Mr Hammond sticks to his current target of balancing the government’s books by the mid 2020s, government debt will fall only slowly as a proportion of GDP, because the long-term outlook for growth is so lacklustre.

Actually this misses out that the national debt to GDP ratio is falling which has been demonstrated by this morning’s official release.

Debt (Public sector net debt excluding public sector banks) at the end of September 2018 was £1,789.5 billion (or 84.3% of gross domestic product (GDP)); an increase of £3.4 billion (or a decrease of 2.4 percentage points) on September 2017.

As you can see we are seeing a fall and economic growth is lacklustre as the recent rally is not yet in the figures. In essence the outlook for the public finances is always poor if you have a weak economy. Anyone who did not know that has been taught it by the experience of Italy.

If we move onto the other parts of the FT quote there is the reference to the ongoing fantasy that the government has some plan to actually balance the books. Personally I think it has been surprised by the recent better figures as it was continuing the past philosophy of George Osborne where a balanced budget was perpetually 3/4 years away.

So in fact something which is being spun as unlikely is if we look at the facts above quite possible especially as we note that the UK Gilt market has not only ignore such reports it has rallied.

“Increasing borrowing is clearly the line of least resistance,” said Paul Johnson, the IFS’ director, noting that Conservative chancellors have historically been more likely to announce giveaways when the public finances were better than expected, than to raise taxes when finances were worse than expected.

Still there is something refreshing which is the acknowledgement of this, and the emphasis is mine.

debt could rise as a share of national income over the longer term, because periodic recessions would hit the public finances.

I do hope that this is not a one-off and that the IFS will continue on this road as I am reminded of a bit in the film Snatch which explains the economic consequences.

All bets are off!

Today’s Data

We had another month of improved figures.

Borrowing (Public sector net borrowing excluding public sector banks) in September 2018 was £4.1 billion, £0.8 billion less than in September 2017; this was the lowest September borrowing for 11 years (since 2007).

This meant that the deeper perspective continues to look good as well.

Borrowing in the current financial year-to-date (YTD) was £19.9 billion: £10.7 billion less than in the same period in 2017; the lowest year-to-date for 16 years (since 2002).

This was due to the fact that tax receipts are solid and spending increases have been below the rate of inflation.

In the current financial YTD, central government received £352.4 billion in income, including £265.6 billion in taxes. This was around 4% more than in the same period in 2017.

Over the same period, central government spent £368.0 billion, around 2% more than in the same period in 2017.

If we look into the detail we see that VAT receipts are strong being up £4.4 billion at £74.7 billion. Also Income Tax is doing well as it is up £5.8 billion at £81 billion in the tax year so far. Given the state of the UK housing market you will not be surprised to see that Stamp Duty receipts have fallen by £0.5 billion to £6.5 billion.

On the other side of the coin you could argue that the fall in spending is flattered by lower debt costs of £3.1 billion as the impact of past inflation rises washes out of index-linked Gilts to some extent.

Comment

As you can see the UK Gilt market has been on the opposite path to the rhetoric of the mainstream media and those presented by them as authorities. One way of looking at this is to consider the phrase “put your money where you mouth is”. But it is also true that markets are not always right which has been highlighted this year best by those who bought Italian bonds at a negative yield. That is not going to be so easy at the next investors conference “Wait, you actually paid to hold Italian bonds?”. It is also perhaps revealing to note that the media seems to have taken Paul Simon’s advice about the Gilt market rally.

No one dared
Disturb the sound of silence

It is, however also wrong to say it is plain sailing as whilst we have entered a better phase it could quickly change if the economy stopped ignoring the weakness in the monetary data. Actually some of the tax receipt data above hints the economy may have done better than we have been told. So on that note let me leave you with the words of Avril Lavigne.

Why’d you have to go and make things so complicated?
I see the way you’re
Actin’ like you’re somebody else, gets me frustrated

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Higher bond yields and higher inflation mean higher national debt costs

The last week or so has brought a theme of this blog back to life and reminds me of the many years I spent working in bond markets. They have spent much of the credit crunch era being an economic version of the dog that did not bark. Much of that has been due to the enormous scale of the QE ( Quantitative Easing) sovereign bond buying policies of many of the major central banks. The politicians who came up with the idea of making central banks independent and then staffing them with people who were anything but should be warmly toasted by their successors. The successors would never have got away with a policy which has benefited them enormously in terms of ability to spend because of lower debt costs.

Italy

However the times are now a-changing and this morning has brought more bad news on this front from Italy. The BTP bond future for December has fallen to 120 which means it has lost a bit over 7 points over the last ten or eleven days. Putting that into yield terms it means that the ten-year yield has reached 3.5% which has a degree of symbolism. A factor in this is described by the Financial Times.

The commission issued its warning to the Five Star and League governing coalition after Rome deviated from the EU’s fiscal rules by proposing a budget deficit equivalent to 2.4 per cent of gross domestic product instead of the 1.6 per cent previously mooted by the finance minister Giovanni Tria. Although the new plans keep Italy under the EU’s 3 per cent deficit threshold, the country’s high debt levels — the highest in the eurozone after Greece — means Rome is required to cut spending to bring debt levels gradually lower.

However the chart below tells us that in fact you can look at it from another point of view entirely.

Actually I think that the situation is more pronounced than that as the ECB has bought 356 billion Euros worth. But you get the idea. It is hard not to think that a major factor in the recent falls is the halving of ECB QE purchases since the beginning of this month and to worry about their end in the New Year. In case you were wondering why the share prices of Italian banks have been tumbling again recently? The fact they have been buying in size in 2018 when one of the trades of 2018 has been to sell Italian bonds gives quite a clue.

If we switch to the consequences for debt costs then a rough rule of thumb is to multiply the 3.5% by the national debt to GDP ratio of 1.33 which gives us 4.65%. In practice this takes time as there is a large stock of debt and the impact from new debt takes time. For example Italy issued 2 billion Euros of its ten-year on the 28th of last month at 2.9%. So a fair bit less than now although much more expensive that it had got used too. This below from the Italian Treasury forecasts gives an idea of how the higher yields impact over time.

The redemptions in 2018 are approximately €184 billion (excluding BOTs) including approximately
€3 billion in relation to the international programme……..the average life of the stock of
government securities, which was 6.9 years at the end of 2017.

Oh and the tipping point below has been reached. From the Wall Street Journal.

Harvinder Sian, a bond strategist at Citigroup, thinks a 10-year yield of 3.5%-4% is now the tipping point, after which yields jump toward the 7% reached at the height of the last euro crisis

Personally I am not so sure about tipping point as the “gentlemen of the spread” ( with apologies to female bond traders) have been selling it at quite a rate anyway.

 

The United States

Here bond yields have been rising recently and let us take the advice of President Trump and look at what has happened during his term of office. Whilst back then Newsweek was busy congratulating Madame President Hilary Clinton my attention was elsewhere.

There has been a clear market adjustment to this which is that the 30 year ( long bond) yield has risen by 0.12% to 2.75%.

We see that it has risen in the Trump era to 3.4% although maybe not by as much as might have been expected. However if we look to shorter maturities we see a much stronger impact.For example the two-year now yields some 2.9% and the five-year some 3.07%. So if you read about flat yield curves this is what is meant although it is not (yet) literally true as there is a 0.5% difference. Thus the US now faces a yield of circa 3% or so looking ahead. This does have an impact as the New York Times has pointed out.

The federal government could soon pay more in interest on its debt than it spends on the military, Medicaid or children’s programs.

In terms of numbers this is what they think.

Within a decade, more than $900 billion in interest payments will be due annually, easily outpacing spending on myriad other programs. Already the fastest-growing major government expense, the cost of interest is on track to hit $390 billion next year, nearly 50 percent more than in 2017, according to the Congressional Budget Office.

If we switch to the Congressional Budget Office it breaks down some of the influences at play here.From its September report.

Outlays for net interest on the public debt increased by $62 billion (or 20 percent), partly because of a higher rate of inflation.

The CBO points out a factor the New York Times missed which is that countries with index-linked debt are also hit by higher inflation. As the US has some US $1.38 trillion of these it is a considerable factor.

Also the US is borrowing more.

The federal budget deficit was $782 billion in fiscal year 2018, the Congressional Budget Office estimates,
$116 billion more than the shortfall recorded in fiscal year 2017………The 2018 deficit equaled an estimated 3.9 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), up from 3.5 percent in
2017. (If not for the timing shifts, the 2018 deficit would have equaled 4.1 percent of GDP.)

Higher bond yields combined with higher fiscal deficits mean more worries about this factor.

At 78 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), federal
debt held by the public is now at its highest level since
shortly after World War II. If current laws generally
remained unchanged, the Congressional Budget Office
projects, growing budget deficits would boost that
debt sharply over the next 30 years; it would approach
100 percent of GDP by the end of the next decade and
152 percent by 2048 . That amount would
be the highest in the nation’s history by far.

I counsel a lot of caution with this as 2048 will have all sorts of things we cannot think of right now. But the debt is heading higher in the period we can reasonably project and I note the CBO is omitting the debt held by the US Federal Reserve so that QE would make the figures look better but the current QT makes it look worse.

Comment

Debt costs and the associated concept of the mythical bond vigilantes have been in a QE driven hibernation but they seem to be showing signs of waking up. If we look at today’s two examples we see different roads to the destination. If we look at the road to Rome we see that the longer-term factor has been the lost decades involving a lack of economic growth. This has made it vulnerable to rising bond yields and which means that the straw currently breaking the camel’s back has been what is a very small fiscal shift. It is also a case of bad timing as it has taken place as the ECB departs the bond purchases scene.

The US is different in that it has a much better economic growth trajectory but has a President who has also primed the fiscal pumps. Should it grow strongly then the Donald will win “bigly” as he will no doubt let us know. However should economic growth weaken or the long overdue recession appear then the debt metrics will slip away quite quickly. That is a road to QE4.

Returning back home I note that UK Gilt yields are higher with the ten-year passing 1.7% last week for the first time for a few years.So the collar is a little tighter.The main impact on the UK came from the rise in inflation in 2017 leading to higher index-linked debt costs. This was the main factor in our annual debt costs rising by around £10 billion between 2015/16 and 2017/18.

 

 

 

 

The struggles of the French economy are continuing

This morning has brought more disappointing news both for and from the French economy. The statistics institute has released this.

In September 2018, households’ confidence in the economic situation has declined: the synthetic index has lost 2 points and reached its lowest level since April 2016. It remains below its long-term average (100).

This index has been in use for 31 years now so the fact that it is below its long-term average does give us some perspective. Also reaching a level not seen since April 2016 takes us back to around when what we might call the Euroboom began (in the second quarter of 2016 the French economy shrank by 0.2%) which will provide some food for thought for the European Central Bank or ECB. It has been on the wires leaking hints about how it will continue to withdraw its monetary stimulus just as its second largest economy has shown more hints of weakness. If we stay with the Euro theme this measure welcomed it by going above 120 but such heady days were capped by 9/11 and now we have seen 97,97,96 and then 94 in September. So there has been a long-running decline overall which did see a rally in the period 2013 to 17 but perhaps ominously turned down at a similar level to 2007/08. Also the outlook is not bright according to French households.

Future standard of living in France: strong
degradation……… The share of households
considering that the future standard of living in France
will improve in the next twelve months has sharply
declined: the corresponding balance has lost 7 points
and stands below its long-term average.

Markit PMI

This hammered out a similar beat last week.

Output growth across the French private sector
slipped to its lowest since December 2016 during the
latest survey period, with data indicating a broadbased
slowdown across both the manufacturing and
service sectors.

This slowdown had as part of it something you might expect with the ongoing diesel debacle and the trade wars.

Manufacturing businesses frequently reported a deterioration in the automotive sector.

This poses a question if we move to what the French economy did in the first half of 2018. Just as a reminder quarterly economic growth went 0.2% in something of a surprise but then backed it up with another 0.2% reading. I contacted Markit’s chief economist pointing out that a reduction on 0.2% as implied by their survey looked grim. But they are sticking to the view that France did better in the first half of the year and in spite of the recorded slowdown is doing this.

Across the region, growth slowed in Germany and
France but both continued to outperform the rest of
the eurozone as a whole, where the pace of
expansion held close to two-year lows.

I have no idea how France is outperforming by doing worse but there you have it. There were times when Markit was accused by the French government of being too pessimistic about France whereas now it must be delighted with its work.

The official surveys for businesses are also above their long-term averages but the situation here is awkward especially if we look at services. Here the confidence indicator has been stable around 105 for a few months or so suggesting growth and yet if we move to the actual data we know that the French economy has struggled.

Bank of France

In the circumstances the projections released earlier this month look rather optimistic.

In a less dynamic, more uncertain international
environment, French GDP is expected to expand
by 1.6% in 2018, 2019 and 2020. GDP growth
should remain above potential, helping to drive
further reductions in France’s unemployment rate.

They are plainly suggesting that the first half of 2018 will be followed by a vastly more dynamic second half involving growth of 1.2% as opposed to 0.4%. But once you look past that I note that 1.6% economic growth is described as “above potential” which to me seems somewhat depressing. Central bankers have a habit of thinking the same thing at the same time and this reads rather like the 1.5% speed limit that the Bank of England Ivory Tower has suggested for the UK economy.

In essence it is downbeat for domestic demand but hopes that export growth and some investment growth will take up the slack. Let us hope that it is right about the area below as unemployment in France remains elevated compared to its peers.

The ILO unemployment rate should fall gradually
to 8.3% at the end of 2020 (France and overseas
departments)

Although that is still high meaning that for some in France unemployment will be all that they have known.

Public Finances

Perhaps we are seeing an official response to the growth malaise. From Reuters.

France will reduce the tax burden on households and companies by nearly 25 billion euros ($29.4 billion) next year, the government said in its 2019 budget bill, pushing the deficit up towards an EU cap as the economy fails to gain pace.

This represents a change of direction although we do see something very familiar these days in the split between businesses and individuals.

Households will see their tax bill reduced by a total 6 billion euros while business taxes will fall by 18.8 billion euros, resulting in the overall tax burden decreasing to 44.2 percent of national income, the lowest for France since 2012.

There is also some pump priming on the expenditure side of the accounts although it is a reduction on the previous 1.4%.

While the government has kept overall public spending stable this year after inflation, the 2019 budget foresees an increase of 0.6 percent after inflation.

If we move to the debt situation we see what is a factor in President Macron’s enthusiasm for a shared budget in the Euro area.

At the end of Q1 2018, the Maastricht debt reached
€2,255.3 billion, a €36.9 billion increase in comparison
to Q4 2017. It accounted for 97.6% of gross domestic
product (GDP), 0.8 points higher than last quarter’s
level.

This looked like it was going through 100% but was rescued by the growth spurt. Now we wait to see what happens next should the French economy continue the struggles of the first half of 2018.Also there are risks on the debt costs side as we see two factors at play.The first is the tend towards higher bond yields we have sen recently and the second is the ongoing reduction in ECB purchases of French government bonds which had reached 410 billion Euros at the end of August.

Comment

If you want some good news then the sporting front has provided it for France in 2018 with its football world cup victory and it is just about to host golf’s Ryder Cup. But the economic news has disappointed pretty much across the board in an irony considering it is supposed to now have a business friendly government. It is true that the tax cuts are weighted towards the private-sector but so far the economy has slowed down rather than speeding up.

Unless the French statistics office has been missing things the ECB will also be noting that its second largest economy has turned weaker. That will provoke thoughts suggesting it can only boom in response to pretty much flat out monetary stimulus. Also there will be worries about what might happen if the ECB tightens policy as opposed to reducing stimulus. There is a case for that from the inflation data as the annual rate has risen to 2.6% on the equivalent measure to UK CPI which may be why French consumers feel so negative about the economy.

The current issues with the sale of Rafale fighter jets to India seems symbolic too. Corruption in such sales is of course far from unique to France but I also note that the way President Macron is distancing himself from it ( It was not on my watch….) bodes badly for what may happen next.

 

 

 

 

 

Austerity is improving the UK Public Finances

As we head towards the weekend we have the opportunity to not only look at an area  where there has been good news but also inject a little humour. The latter was unintentionally provided by the OBR or Office for Budget Responsibility earlier this week.

second, we look at the potential fiscal impact of future government activity, by making 50-year projections of all public spending, revenues and significant financial
transactions, such as government loans to students.

No your eyes do not deceive you it really has forecast our fiscal future out towards 2068. This is from an organisation that in its eight years of existence has shown amazing consistency in being wrong. Sometimes it has been wrong pretty much immediately and at other times we have has to wait but usually not for too long. If we look back to its early days then let me give you two examples of its forecasting arrows not only missing the target but soaring out of the stadium with the crowd ducking for cover. Wage growth was forecast to be around 4.5% now and that is being nice to them as you see they got unemployment wrong too and so if we apply their “output gap” style analysis they would have wage growth at 5% or more. Also they would have Gilt yields up towards 5% as well whereas all are below 2% and the ten-year yield is 1.24%.

For newer readers that is the road which led to this.

The first rule of OBR Club is that the OBR is always wrong.

Putting it another way here is how something which is very good what is called the Whole of Government Accounts which as you can see below is sadly converted into laughing-stock status.

The net present value of future public service pension payments arising from past employment was £1,835 billion or 92 per cent of GDP. This is £410 billion higher than a year earlier, with the rise more than explained by the use of a lower discount rate to convert the projected flow of future payments into a one-off net present value and by other changes to assumptions underpinning the value of the liabilities.

The saga starts really well as I regularly get asked for an estimate of the UK’s pension liabilities but as you can see an enormous change has happened due to “a lower discount rate” . So the interest-rate or more specifically yield has been changed by an establishment that has consistently got yields not only wrong but very wrong. This also happened in the insurance world where this sort of blundering in the dark caused a lot of changes and costs.

The NHS

The OBR weighed in on this subject earlier this week and as a reminder this is the issue as described by the BBC.

Last month, the Prime Minister announced that the NHS in England would get an extra £20bn a year by 2023.

The £114bn budget will rise by an average of 3.4% annually.

In itself this is simple as government’s plan to spend more all the time and actually the OBR feels it needs to do so as the demographics of an ageing population bites. Yet we ended up with more heat than light and I could write a whole post on the “Brexit Dividend” so let us instead look at the overall position. There are three ways this can be paid for.

The easiest is that the economy grows by enough to finance it via higher taxes and lower social spending. After all we live in an era of Black Swan events but even in these days they happen only from time to time so the other choices are higher taxes or borrowing more. As you are about to see the public finances data have been pretty good over the past 18 months or so ( something else the OBR got wrong as it predicted a pretty substantial rise for the fiscal year just gone). So as we stand we could borrow the money quite easily and as I explained earlier we can do so cheaply in fact extremely cheaply in historical terms. Just for clarity as these issues get heated I am not advocating such a move simply saying that as we stand we could and probably quite easily. That seems to have got lost as at least some of the media looks for examples of higher taxes in response to the extra spending.

This whole issue makes me look back over the last issue and something stands out so let me put it in italics.

Over the credit crunch era we have borrowed a lot when it has been (relatively) expensive and not it is cheaper we are borrowing much less.

Some of that was forced on us but not all of it.

Today’s data

This continues to be good.

Public sector net borrowing (excluding public sector banks) decreased by £0.8 billion to £5.4 billion in June 2018, compared with June 2017;

As is the picture with a little more perspective

Public sector net borrowing (excluding public sector banks) in the current financial year-to-date (April 2018 to June 2018) was £16.8 billion; that is, £5.4 billion less than in the same period in 2017; this is the lowest year-to-date (April to June) net borrowing since 2007.

So we are back to pre credit crunch levels in this regard and the trajectory is lower. If we look into the detail then we see this about revenues.

In the current financial year-to-date, central government received £169.4 billion in income, including £125.0 billion in taxes. This was around 3% more than in the same period in 2017.

Looked at like that we get a confirmation of the slowing of the housing market as Stamp Duty revenues have fallen by £300 million to £3.1 billion and the QE operations of the Bank of England contributed £600 million less.

But on the other side of the ledger we do for once see some outright austerity.

Over the same period, central government spent £184.2 billion, around 1% less than in the same period in 2017.

Before we get too excited debt interest fell by £2.2 billion which will be mostly if not entirely the impact of lower ( RPI ) inflation on index-linked Gilts. Also the numbers for local councils have swung too so allowing for that we do not have outright austerity but we do on the measure compared with inflation.

National Debt

There is good news here too at least in relative terms.

Public sector net debt (excluding public sector banks) was £1,792.3 billion at the end of June 2018, equivalent to 85.2% of gross domestic product (GDP), an increase of £33.0 billion (or a decrease of 1.0 percentage points as a ratio of GDP) on June 2017.

There are also numbers excluding the Bank of England but sadly the numbers published are inconsistent. This happened a few months ago as well, There are also wider numbers for what previously I would have said was something of a gold standard but after the pension revision we looked at above I will merely say they are worth a look.

The overall net liability in the WGA was £2,421 billion or 122 per cent of GDP at the end of March 2017, up £435 billion on the previous year’s restated results ( OBR)

Comment

We have been on quite a journey with the UK public finances and to some extent it has been this sort of Journey.

It goes on and on and on and on

We have also seen that

Some will win some will lose

Because until this phase a lot of the austerity has been from one group to another as for example comparing the Triple Lock for the Basic State Pension with its 2.5% minimum with the 1% per annum for other social benefits and pay rises. But with the better news can we say this?

Don’t stop believing
Hold on to that feeling

We can to some extent but that does not mean the sky is pure blue. The clouds come from all the efforts to manipulate the numbers which would take an article in their own right and also the way the national debt has risen. Which allows me one more example of OBR Club unless of course we find an alternative universe where the national debt peaked at below 70% of GDP and then fell primarily due to us being in surplus for the last couple of years……

 

 

 

 

 

 

The UK Public Finances are improving fast

A feature of the credit crunch era is the way that the same or similar stories get recycled and this is what I was thinking of when the proposed NHS ( National Health Service) spending boost was announced by Theresa May at the weekend.

There has been a change of Chancellor as George Osborne was removed and replaced with Phillip Hammond and it looks as though the new government will be fiscally looser.

That was from October 3rd 2016 and you may recall it was in tune with the mood music as even the IMF which had helped impose so much austerity on Greece had come out in favour of fiscal stimuli. However like with so much about the current government it never really happened on any scale. In fact if we look at the numbers I quoted then we see that the UK has continued to reduce its deficit and as ever confound the forecasts of the Office of Budget Responsibility or OBR.

In the financial year ending March 2016 (April 2015 to March 2016), the public sector borrowed £76.5 billion. This was £18.9 billion lower than in the previous financial year and less than half of that in the financial year ending March 2010 (both in terms of £ billion and percentage of GDP).

That was the picture then and it has been replaced by a deficit more like £40 billion in the fiscal year just completed. So whilst there has been an ongoing stimulus as we have had a persistent deficit the annual amount has been reduced partly due to growth in the economy which has made the national debt situation look more contained and to some extent better.

Public sector net debt (excluding public sector banks) was £1,777.3 billion at the end of April 2018, equivalent to 85.1% of gross domestic product (GDP), an increase of £56.8 billion (or 0.3 percentage points as a ratio of gross domestic product (GDP)) on April 2017.

As you can see it is rising in amount but the growth in the economy means that relatively it has changed much less.

Today’s data

This morning has brought borrowing figures which are very good.

Public sector net borrowing (excluding public sector banks) decreased by £2.0 billion to £5.0 billion in May 2018, compared with May 2017; this is the lowest May net borrowing since 2005.

Of course monthly data can be erratic but the fiscal year so far seems set fair as well.

Public sector net borrowing (excluding public sector banks) in the current financial year-to-date (April 2018 to May 2018) was £11.8 billion; that is, £4.1 billion less than in the same period in 2017; this is the lowest year-to-date (April to May) net borrowing since 2007.

Should we continue on anything like such a trajectory this year will see a solid fall in the fiscal deficit.

The NHS Proposal

If we skip the foaming at the mouth over the phrase “Brexit Dividend” it was reported like this by the Financial Times.

The NHS financial settlement — which could be unveiled as soon as next week, ahead of the taxpayer-financed system’s 70th anniversary — is expected to provide increases to the £150bn UK health budget of at least 3 per cent above inflation every year.

As you can see implementing such a policy would be a boost in real terms as at least 3% is circa £5 billion a year. The Institute for Fiscal Studies puts it like this.

Yesterday’s announcement implies that day-to-day spending by NHS England will increase by £16 billion in real terms between now and 2022–23 (with a further £4 billion in 2023–24).

Paying for it

There are three routes. One is simply higher economic growth which in the short-term is problematic as we are in a soft patch which the monetary numbers are signalling will remain through the autumn. Taxes could rise but this government ha shad trouble with that as the debacle over national insurance for the self-employed showed. This leaves borrowing more which in the circumstances seems feasible.

In terms of amount we are borrowing less as discussed above and the cost of our borrowing remains cheap. The UK ten-year Gilt yield is a mere 1.3% and the more relevant for these purposes thirty-year yield is 1.77% . This is of course more expensive than in the late summer of 2016 when Bank of England Governor Mark Carney spent £60 billion on in this respect kamikaze style purchases driving the market to all-time price highs and yield lows including in the madness some negative ones. But it is in terms of the thirty-years I have been following this market certainly low and in fact ultra low.

The Institute of Fiscal Studies is rather dismissive of this route.

But a significant increase in forecast borrowing would mean that the government was not taking its stated commitment to eliminate the deficit by the mid-2020s seriously. The deficit is already forecast to be £21 billion in 2022–23, implying further consolidation measures – in the form of tax rises or spending cuts –would need to be implemented.  The Government could decide to abandon its fiscal objective, as its predecessors have frequently done in the past.

Actually the recent fiscal data suggests that they probably would not have to do that as we see yet another Ivory Tower lost in the clouds of its own rhetoric.

What has today’s data told us?

For all the talk of a fiscal stimulus something of a squeeze has been going on.

In the latest financial year-to-date, central government received £112.9 billion in income, including £82.6 billion in taxes. This was around 3% more than in the same period in 2017.

Over the same period, central government spent £123.6 billion, roughly equal to that spent in the same period in 2017.

In terms of controlling public spending we have come to learn that this is about as good as it gets. We are mostly incapable of reducing it in nominal terms but we do have phases of reducing it in real terms.

Also the receipts data hint at the economy having been stronger than we thought. What I mean by this is that income tax receipts have risen by £2,5 billion to £25,5 billion in the latest couple of months. Indeed even the much maligned retail sector may be getting some support as VAT ( Value Added Tax) receipts rose by £1.1 billion to £23.2 billion. In case this seems like over explaining the rise the numbers are influenced by Bank of England QE from which dividend or coupon payments are taken as receipts and that was a -£0.9 billion influence.

Oh and the spending numbers have been boosted by a fall in debt costs as the rise in ( RPI) inflation washes out of the system.

Comment

There is a lot to consider here so let us start with the UK public finances. Back in October 2016 they were disappointing in the circumstances and now they are good in the circumstances. As some tax receipts represent past activity there may be at least some logic at play as it takes time for the numbers to reflect it. If the data carries on like this then those who use tax receipts as a measure of the economy may feel it is out performing what the GDP data tells us and fits the employment numbers.

The catch is the current slow down and the one we expect from the money supply data which will weaken the above trends. However we find yet another situation where the first rule of OBR Club has hit the cricket ball for six.

 and £5.7 billion less than official (Office for Budget Responsibility) expectations;

So as we stand the UK Public Finances might shrug off a fiscal boost for the NHS although as ever recession would change that. As to how much of a good idea it is remains open to question. On a personal level Frimley Park Hospital gave good care to my father and on less serious matters my mother and I am grateful to Chelsea and Westminster for the work on my knee. Yet there is also an institutional problem.

An expert on hospital mortality data has said scandals such as the deaths at Gosport War Memorial Hospital could be being replicated elsewhere in the NHS.

Prof Sir Brian Jarman told the Today Programme he thinks “it is likely” similar situations are happening in other hospitals.

An inquiry found doctors at the hospital gave patients “dangerous” amounts of powerful painkillers.

More than 450 older patients’ lives were shortened as a result. ( BBC)

 

Better news for the UK Public Finances but at what social cost?

Last week some new data emerged which gave us a slightly different perspective on the UK government finances.

General government deficit (or net borrowing) was £39.4 billion in 2017, a decrease of £19.0 billion compared with 2016; this is equivalent to 1.9% of GDP, 1.1 percentage points below the reference value of 3.0% set out in the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure.

We look regularly for a deeper perspective and those numbers reveal several realities. Firstly the simple fact that the number is much lower at just over £39 billion and secondly that relative to our annual economic output it is now a small amount. In fact so small we pass one of the Maastricht criteria.

This is the first time the government deficit has been below the 3.0% Maastricht reference value since 2007, when it was 2.6% of GDP.

The latter quote provides some food for thought as we see that in annual fiscal terms we are now better off than in 2007. Also these are numbers we can compare internationally as for example the French fiscal deficit was 2.6% of GDP and the Spanish one was 3.1%. Spain is an interesting example as it has of course seen strong economic growth over the past couple of years or so but still has such a deficit leading us to mull whether Euro area austerity was followed or whether more realistically in my opinion it has oiled the economic wheels with a fiscal stimulus? Especially if we note to continue the same analogy that the fiscal wheels themselves have been oiled by the bond buying of the European Central Bank or ECB which now totals some 238.5 billion Euros of Spanish government bonds and rising. This means that Spain has a ten-year bond yield of a mere 1.31% a far cry from the heady days of the Euro area crisis.

However the lost decade in fiscal terms for the UK has led to this.

General government gross debt was £1,786.3 billion at the end of December 2017, equivalent to 87.7% of gross domestic product (GDP), 27.7 percentage points above the reference value of 60% set out in the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure.

So we find that the national debt has increased considerably as a result of the ongoing fiscal deficits. We were supposed under the original Coalition government plan to reach a balance and head into surplus around 2016 albeit under a dubious current expenditure definition but instead we still have a deficit. However we are doing better than France ( 97%) and Spain ( 98.3%). Let me throw in something rarely raised, is this the real reason for all the QE bond buying we have seen? To make the national debts and fiscal deficits more affordable via lower bond yields?

Gilt Yields

These are as discussed above something which have boosted the UK fiscal numbers. It is not possible to say exactly how much they have helped by but we do know that without £435 billion of purchases by the Bank of England the ten-year Gilt yield would be a fair bit higher than the present 1.51%. I still recall when hitting 2% was considered extremely low and of course the panic-stricken Sledgehammer QE purchases of late summer 2016 drove it down to 0.5% as the market picked them off. Interestingly some numbers have been calculated for Germany but I would take them as a broad sweep rather than precise.

Latest data suggest Germany has saved €162bn in government interest expenditure since the start of the crisis, thanks to the ECB. ( @fwred )

As to the annual cost we see that in the last fiscal year UK debt costs were up by £6 billion to £54.7 billion mostly driven I would think by the higher costs of our RPI linked debt.

Today’s data

They opened with some good news. From the Office for National Statistics.

Public sector net borrowing (excluding public sector banks) decreased by £0.8 billion to £1.3 billion in March 2018, compared with March 2017; this is the lowest March net borrowing since 2004.

Looking into the detail adds more smoke than insight because we had better taxes from income plus a fall in debt costs that was not offset by higher spending. So let us move to the figures for the latest fiscal year for a better perspective.

Public sector net borrowing (excluding public sector banks) decreased by £3.5 billion to £42.6 billion in the latest financial year (April 2017 to March 2018), compared with the previous financial year; this is the lowest net borrowing since the financial year ending March 2007.

Thus we see better news again and the size of the reduction is likely to increase as revisions are made if last year was any guide.

 the estimate has been revised downward by £5.8 billion, from £52.0 billion to £46.2 billion.

As ever my first rule of OBR club has worked a treat. From a year ago.

The deficit is now forecast to come in at £51.7 billion this year, down from the £68.2 billion we forecast in November (Chart 1.1). We now expect the deficit to increase by £6.5 billion next year rather than shrinking by £7.2 billion (adjusted for a change in how the ONS records corporate taxes).

Even by their low standards this is an especially poor effort. Time for a few more Knighthoods I think to restore at least a veneer of respectability.For newer readers my first rule of OBR club is that it is always wrong. On that basis you may like to know that it forecasts next years deficit at £37.1 billion.

Ch-ch-changes

If we look at the numbers we see that broadly we improved even allowing for the fact we spent an extra £6 billion on debt interest-rate and that VAT receipts only increased by 2.4%. The latter does not really even match the inflation we have seen. If you wished to pin it to one factor the amount collected from National Insurance rose by 5.4%.

Oh and there is another area where the government has reason to be grateful to the Bank of England. Stamp Duty receipts from property transactions rose by just under 10% to £13.6 billion.

Comment

This has been a long slow grind and we are already two years or so late on the original plans. But there is good news in the continuing improvement albeit that as ever we see plenty of disinformation.

Of this £42.6 billion of public sector net borrowing excluding public sector banks (PSNB ex), £42.7 billion related to capital spending (or net investment) such as infrastructure, while the cost of the “day-to-day” activities of the public sector (the current budget deficit) was in surplus by £0.1 billion. This current budget deficit surplus is the first annual surplus since the financial year ending March 2002.

Those who have followed my analysis will no doubt already be thinking that there is a world of difference between the way the numbers were calculated in 2002 and now. I would also love to see how they define and calculate investment.

The real issues are whether we can continue to grow as economic growth is always the main player here in the long run? On that front there has been another hint of a slowing in the German economy this morning. Next is the recurring issue of whether this has been stimulus or austerity or even more confusingly both? A pointer towards austerity can be seen from this earlier.

Between 1st April 2017 and 31st March 2018, The Trussell Trust’s foodbank network distributed 1,332,952 three-day emergency food supplies to people in crisis, a 13% increase on the previous year. 484,026 of these went to children.

Perhaps the main government change has been a redistribution which if we add in the shift towards the asset rich driven by the Bank of England suddenly puts a dark cloud over the data.

 

 

The IMF debt arrow warning misses the real target

Yesterday brought the latest forecasts from the IMF ( International Monetary Fund). Don’t worry I am not concerned with them as after all Greece would be now have recovered if they were right. But there is a link to the Greece issue and the way that it has found itself trying to push an enormous deadweight of debt which meant that Euro area policy had to change to make the interest-rates on it much cheaper. Here is the ESM or European Stability Mechanism on that subject.

1% Average interest rate on ESM loans to Greece (as of 28/04/2017)

That is a far cry from the “punishment” 4.5% that regular readers will recall that Germany was calling for in the early days and the implementation of which added to the trouble. Also if we continue with the debt theme there is another familiar consequence.

That is because the two institutions can borrow cash much more cheaply than Greece itself, and offer a long period for repayment. Greece will not have to start repaying its loans to the ESM before 2034, for instance.

So in the words of the payday lenders Greece now has one affordable monthly payment or something like that. As we note the IMF research below I think it is important to keep the consequences in mind.

The IMF Fiscal Monitor

Here is the opening salvo.

Global debt hit a new record high of $164 trillion in 2016, the equivalent of 225 percent of global GDP. Both private and public debt have surged over the past decade.

Later we get a breakdown of this.

Of the $164 trillion, 63 percent is non financial private sector debt, and 37 percent is public sector debt.

That is a fascinating breakdown so the banks have eliminated all their own debt have they? Perhaps it is the new hybrid debt being counted as equity. Also the IMF quickly drops its interest in the 63% which is a shame as there are all sorts of begged questions here. For example who is it borrowed from and is there any asset backing? In the UK for example it would include the fast rising unsecured or consumer credit sector as well as the mortgaged sector but of course even that relies on the house price boom for an asset value. Then we could get onto student debt which whilst I have my doubts about some of the degrees offered in return I have much more confidence in young people as an asset if I may put it like that. So sadly the IMF has missed the really interesting questions and of course is stepping on something of a land mine in discussing government debt after its debacle in Greece.

Government Debt

Here is the IMF hammering out its beat.

Debt in advanced economies is at 105 percent of
GDP on average—levels not seen since World War II.
In emerging market and middle-income economies,
debt is close to 50 percent of GDP on average—levels
last seen during the 1980s debt crisis. For low-income
developing countries, average debt-to-GDP ratios have
been climbing at a rapid pace and exceed 40 percent
as of 2017.

If we invert the order I notice that there are issues with the poorer countries again.

Moreover, nearly half of this debt is on
nonconcessional terms, which has resulted in a doubling
of the interest burden as a share of tax revenues
in the past 10 year.

This gives us food for though as you see one of the charts shows that such countries have received two phases of what is called relief, once in the 90s and once on the noughties. Is it relief or as Elvis Presley put it?

We’re caught in a trap
I can’t walk out
Because I love you too much baby

Next time I see Ann Pettifor who was involved in the Jubilee debt effort I will ask about this. Does such debt relief in a way validate policies which lead such countries straight back into debt trouble?

Advanced Countries

Here the choice of 2016 by the IMF is revealing. I have a little sympathy in that the data is often much slower to arrive than you might think but the government debt world has changed since them. Any example of this came from the UK only this week.

General government deficit (or net borrowing) was £39.4 billion in 2017, a decrease of £19.0 billion compared with 2016; this is equivalent to 1.9% of GDP, 1.1 percentage points below the reference value of 3.0% set out in the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure.

It is hard not to have a wry smile at the UK passing one of the Maastricht criteria! But the point is that the deficit situation is much better albeit far slower than promised meaning that whilst the debt soared back then now prospects are different.

In truth I fear that the IMF has taken a trip to what we might call Trumpton.

In the United States—where
a fiscal stimulus is happening when the economy is
close to full employment, keeping overall deficits above
$1 trillion (5 percent of GDP) over the next three
years—fiscal policy should be recalibrated to ensure
that the government debt-to-GDP ratio declines over
the medium term.

I have quite a bit of sympathy with questioning why the US has added a fiscal stimulus to all the monetary stimulus? I know it has been raising interest-rates but the truth is that it has less monetary stimulus now rather than a contraction. Those of us who fear that modern economies can only claim growth if they continue to be stimulated or a type of economic junkie culture will think along these lines. But also they lose ground with waffle like “full employment” in a world where the Japanese unemployment rate is 2.5% as to the 4.1% in the US. Oh and whilst we are at it there is of course the fact that Japan has been running such fiscal deficits for years now.

What about interest-rates and yields?

There was this from Lisa Abramowicz of Bloomberg yesterday.

While U.S. yields may still be rising, the world is still awash in central-bank stimulus. The amount of negative-yielding debt has actually grown by nearly $1.4 trillion since February, to about $8.3 trillion: Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Negative Yielding Debt index

My point is that for all the talk and analysis of higher interest-rates and yields we get this.

Comment

There is a fair bit to consider here and let me open with a bit of tidying up. Comparing a debt stock to an income/output flow ( GDP) requires also some idea of the cost of the debt. Moving on an opportunity has been missed to look at private-debt as we note that US consumer credit has passed the pre credit crunch peak. Of course the economy is larger but there are areas of troubled water such as car loans. This matters because the last surge in government debt was driven by the socialisation of private debt previously owned by the banks.

If we note the debt we have generically then there are real questions now as to high interest-rates can go? Some of you have suggested around 3% but in the end that also depends on economic growth which is apposite because the slowing of some monetary indicators suggests we may be about to get less of it. Should that turn further south then more than a few places will see an economic slow down that starts with both negative interest-rates and yields. These are the real issues as opposed to old era thinking.

• First, high government debt can make countries
vulnerable to rollover risk because of large gross
financing needs, particularly when maturities are
short

In reality that will be QE’d away if I may put it like that and the real question is where will the side-effects and consequences of the QE response appear? For example the distributional effects in favour of those with assets. Perhaps the real issue is the continuing prevalence of negative yields in a (claimed) recovery………From the Fab Four.

You never give me your money
You only give me your funny paper
And in the middle of negotiations
You break down

Me on Core Finance TV