France decides to Spend! Spend! Spend!

Yesterday brought something that was both new and familiar from France. The new part is a substantial extra fiscal stimulus. The familiar is that France as regular readers will be aware had been pushing the boundaries of the Euro area fiscal rules anyway, This is something which has led to friction with Italy which has come under fire for its fiscal position. Whereas France pretty much escaped it in spite of having its nose pressed against the Growth and Stability Pact limit of 3% of Gross Domestic Product for the fiscal deficit. Actually that Pact already feels as if it is from a lifetime ago although those who have argued that it gets abandoned when it suits France and Germany are no doubt having a wry smile.

The Details

Here is a translation of President Macron’s words.

We are now entering a new phase: that of recovery and reconstruction. To overcome the most important in our modern history, to prevent the cancer of mass unemployment from setting in, which unfortunately our country has suffered too long, today we decide to invest massively. 100 billion, of which 40 billion comes from financing obtained hard from the European Union, will thus be injected into the economy in the coming months. It is an unprecedented amount which, in relation to our national wealth, makes the French plan one of the most ambitious.

So the headline is 100 billion Euros which is a tidy sum even in these inflated times for such matters. Also you will no doubt have spotted that he is trying to present something of a windfall from the European Union which is nothing of the sort. The money will simply be borrowed collectively rather than individually. So it is something of a sleight of hand. One thing we can agree on is the French enthusiasm for fiscal policy, although of course they have been rather less enthusiatic in the past about such policies from some of their Euro area partners.

There are three components to this.

Out of 100 billion euros, 30 billion are intended to finance the ecological transition.

As well as a green agenda there is a plan to boost business which involves 35 billion Euros of which the main component is below.

As part of the recovery plan, production taxes will be reduced by € 10bn from January 1, 2021, and by sustainable way. It is therefore € 20bn in tax cuts of production over 2021–2022.

That is an interesting strategy at a time of a soaring fiscal deficit to day the least. So far we have ecology and competitiveness which seems to favour big business. Those who have followed French history may enjoy this reference from Le Monde.

With an approach that smacks of industrial Colbertism

The remaining 35 billion Euros is to go into what is described as public cohesion which is supporting jobs and health. In fact the jobs target is ambitious.

According to the French government, the plan will help the economy make up for the coronavirus-related loss of GDP by the end of 2022, and help create 160,000 new jobs next year.  ( MarketWatch)

Is it necessary?

PARIS (Reuters) – French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire believes that the French economy could perform better than currently forecast this year, he said on Friday.

“I think we will do better in 2020 than the 11% recession forecast at the moment,” Le Maire told BFM TV.

I suspect Monsieur Le Maire is a Beatles fan and of this in particular.

It’s getting better
Since you’ve been mine
Getting so much better all the time!

Of course things have got worse as he has told us they have got better. Something he may have repeated this morning.

August PMI® data pointed to the sharpest contraction in French construction activity for three months……….At the sub-sector level, the decrease in activity was broad based. Work undertaken on commercial projects fell at the
quickest pace since May, and there was a fresh decline in civil engineering activity after signs of recovery in June and July. Home building activity contracted for the sixth month running, although the rate of decrease was softer than in July. ( Markit)

We have lost a lot of faith in PMi numbers but even so there is an issue as I do not know if there is a French equivalent of “shovel ready”? But construction is a tap that fiscal policy can influence relatively quickly and there seems to be no sign of that at all.

Indeed the total PMI picture was disappointing.

“The latest PMI data came as a disappointment
following the sharp rise in private sector activity seen
during July, which had spurred hopes that the French
economy could undergo a swift recovery towards precoronavirus levels of output. However, with activity
growth easing considerably in the latest survey period,
those hopes have been dashed…”

So the data seems to be more in line with the view expressed below.

It is designed to try to “avoid an economic collapse,” French Prime Minister Jean Castex said on Thursday. ( MarketWatch)

Where are the Public Finances?

According to the Trading Economics this is this mornings update.

France’s government budget deficit widened to EUR 151 billion in the first seven months of 2020 from EUR 109.7 billion a year earlier, amid efforts to support the economy hit by the coronavirus crisis. Government spending jumped 10.4 percent from a year earlier to EUR 269.3 billion, while revenues went down 6.3 percent to EUR 142.25 billion

I think their definition of spending has missed out debt costs.

As of the end of June the public debt was 1.992 trillion Euros.

Comment

I have avoided being to specific about the size of the contraction of the economy and hence numbers like debt to GDP. There are several reasons for this. One is simply that we do not know them and also we do not know how much of the contraction will be temporary and how much permanent? We return to part of yesterday’s post and France will be saying Merci Madame Lagarde with passion. The various QE bond purchase programmes mean that France has a benchmark ten-year yield of -0.18% and even long-term borrowing is cheap as it estimates it will pay 0.57% for some 40 year debt on Monday. That’s what you get when you buy 473 billion Euros of something and that is just the original emergency programme or PSPP and not the new emergency programme or PEPP. On that road the European Union fund is pure PR as it ends up at the ECB anyway.

The Bank of France has looked at the chances of a rebound and if we look at unemployment and it looks rather ominous.

However, the speed of the recovery in the coming months and years is more uncertain, as is the peak in the unemployment rate, which the Banque de France forecasts at 11.8% in mid-2021 for France……….Chart 1 shows that in France, Germany, Italy, and the United States, once the unemployment rate peaked, it fell at a rate that was fairly similar from one crisis to the next: on average 0.55 percentage point (pp) per year in France and Italy, 0.7 pp in Germany, and 0.63 pp in the United States.

There is not much cheer there and they seem to have overlooked that unemployment rates have been much higher in the Euro area than the US. But we can see how this might have triggered the French fiscal response especially at these bond yields.

But Giulia Sestieri is likely to find that her conclusion about fiscal policy is likely to see the Bank of France croissant and espresso trolley also contain the finest brandy as it arrives at her desk.

Ceteris paribus, the lessons of economic literature suggest potentially large fiscal multipliers during the post-Covid19 recovery phase

Mind you that is a lot of caveats for one solitary sentence.

Oh France! Oh Spain! Oh Italy!

After yesterday’s update from Germany we move onto the second, third and fourth largest economies in the Euro area, who rather curiously have produced their figures in that order this morning. So as we mull the fact that Germany accelerated the release of its GDP ( Gross Domestic Product) numbers at exactly the wrong time we also need to be ready for bad news.

In Q2 2020, GDP in volume terms declined: –13.8%, after –5.9% in Q1 2020. It is 19% lower than in Q2 2019.  ( Insee of France)

That is like two explosions going off with the 5.9% being credit crunch like but then it being followed by a much louder bang. The total of -19% is somewhat chilling.

We know the cause.

 GDP’s negative developments in first half of 2020 is linked to the shut-down of “non-essential” activities in the context of the implementation of the lockdown between mid-March and the beginning of May

But the beginning of the recovery seems understated.

The gradual ending of restrictions led to a gradual recovery of economic activity in May and June, after the low point reached in April.

In terms of the detail well everything in the domestic economy fell with one of the components being rather curious.

Household consumption expenditures dropped (–11.0% after –5.8%), as did total gross fixed capital formation in a more pronounced manner (GFCF: –17.8% after –10.3%). General government expenditure also stepped back (–8.0% after –3.5%).

I wonder how they managed to find a category of government spending that fell?! Maybe it was stuff they could not buy as it was out of stock. But it rather sticks out as does this.

 Food expenditure slightly decreased (–0.5% after +2.8%).

In the UK we still seem to be spending more on food whereas France seems to have stocked up and then begun to de-stock.

Although the numbers are larger trade turns out to be a much smaller factor which reminds us that trade numbers are unreliable at the best of times and maybe nearly hopeless right now.

In Q2 2020, imports declined strongly (–17.3% after –10.3%), notably in manufactured goods. Exports fell in a more pronounced manner (–25.5% after –6.1%), in particular in transport equipment. All in all, foreign trade contributed negatively to GDP growth this quarter (–2.3 points after –0.1points).

Make of that what you will.

Spain

This starts especially grimly as the opening page tells us there has been a 22.1% fall in GDP. So let us look more deeply at the state of play.

The Spanish GDP registers a variation of -18.5% in the second quarter of 2020 compared to the previous quarter in terms of volume. This rate is 13.3 points lower than that registered in the first quarter.

which brings us to this.

The year-on-year change in the GDP stood at −22.1%, compared to −4.1% for the quarter
preceding.

That is a bit of a “Boom! Boom! Boom!” moment although notin an economic sense and the breakdown is as follows.

The contribution of domestic demand to year-on-year GDP growth is −19.2 points, 15.5 points lower than that of the first quarter. For its part, external demand represents a contribution of −2.9 points, 2.5 points lower than that of the previous quarter.

We get a sort of confirmation from all of this from the hours worked numbers which at the same time provide a critique of the unemployment data.

In year-on-year terms, hours worked decreased by 24.8%, rate 20.6 points lower than in the first quarter of 2020, and full-time equivalent positions down 18.5%, 17.9 points less than in the first quarter, which represents decrease of 3,394 thousand full-time equivalent jobs in one year.

Some areas saw not far off a collapse in demand, because of past issues the construction numbers stood out to me.

Household final consumption expenditure experiences a year-on-year decrease of 25.7%, 19.9 points less than in the last quarter. For its part, the final consumption expenditure of the Public Administrations presented an inter annual variation of 3.5%, one tenth less than that of the preceding quarter.
Gross capital formation registered a decrease of 25.8%, 20.5 points higher than that of previous quarter. The investment in tangible fixed assets decreases at a year-on-year rate of 30.8%, which it represents 22.4 points more than in the previous quarter. By components, the investment in homes and other buildings and constructions decreased 22.6 points, going from −8.3% to -30.9%, while investment in machinery, capital goods and weapons systems it decreases 23 points when presenting a rate of −32.3%, compared to −9.3% in the previous quarter.

The reason why that sector stands out is the way it affected the economy and the banks as the credit crunch rolled into the Euro area crisis.

Italy

We advance on Italy nervously because of its past record but the fall was in fact the smallest of these three.

 In the second quarter of 2020 the seasonally and calendar adjusted, chained volume measure of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) decreased by 12.4 per cent with respect to the previous quarter and by 17.3 per
cent over the same quarter of previous year.

As to the breakdown well it was everything if we skip over a slightly bizarre focus on farming.

The quarter on quarter change is the result of a decrease of value added in agriculture, forestry and
fishing, in that of industry as well as in services. From the demand side, there is a negative contribution
both by the domestic component (gross of change in inventories) and the net export component.

Farming is of course very important but it hardly the main player in this context.

Comment

There are a lot of contexts to this so let us start with the national ones. Spain was the main “Euro Boom” beneficiary with annual economic growth reaching 4.2% in early 2015 but now we are reminded that it can be the leader of the pack in down as well as upswings. Italy has lost less but it is hard not to think that is because it has less to lose and this from  @fwred is rather chilling.

As the morning has developed we can now look at the overall picture for the Euro area.

In the second quarter 2020, still marked by COVID-19 containment measures in most Member States, seasonally
adjusted GDP decreased by 12.1% in the euro area and by 11.9% in the EU, compared with the previous quarter,
according to a preliminary flash estimate published by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union.
These were by far the sharpest declines observed since time series started in 1995. In the first quarter of 2020,
GDP had decreased by 3.6% in the euro area and by 3.2% in the EU.

We can use the numbers to compare with the United States as the annual decline of 15% of the Euro area is larger than the 9.5% there. I think this is outside the margin of error but potential errors right now will be large.

There is a collective assumption that these things will bounce back and I am sure that some areas will. But there are others where it will not and if we think of the “girlfriend in a coma” it never seems to do that. Quarterly economic output in Italy was 417 billion Euros at the beginning of 2017 rising to 431 billion and now falling to 356 billion.

In the end this is the problem with all the can kicking. We have arrived at the next storm without fixing the damage caused by the last one. Where do you go when the official interest-rate is -0.6% and of course -1% for the banks?

Today’s surveys show that any economic recovery in France remains distant

Today out focus shifts to the second largest economy in the Euro area as La Belle France takes centre stage. Let us open with the thoughts of the finance minister on the economic state of play.

PARIS (Reuters) – Recent economic indicators for France are satisfactory but too fragile to change the forecast for an 11% economic contraction this year, Bruno Le Maire said Thursday.

The Minister of the Economy, speaking to the National Assembly for the debate on the orientation of public finances for 2021, said he expected economic growth of 8% for France next year and expressed the will that the in 2022, activity returns to its levels preceding the crisis linked to the new coronavirus.

Only a politician could use the words “satisfactory” and “too fragile” in the same sentence and it is a grim one of a 11% decline in GDP ( Gross Domestic Product) for this year. This means that the expectations for France are worse than those for the Euro area as a whole.

The expectations of SPF respondents for euro area real GDP growth averaged -8.3%, 5.7% and 2.4% for 2020, 2021 and 2022, respectively. ( ECB 16th July)

So around 3% worse which is interesting and I note that there is a similar pattern of predicting most but far from all of it returning in 2021. That is what you call making a forecast that is like an each-way bet where if you do recover no-one will care and if you do worse than that you highlight you did not expect a full recovery. The truth is that none of us know how 2020 will finish let alone what will happen next year. Maybe the quote below suffers from translation from French but “expressed the will?”

expressed the will that the in 2022, activity returns to its levels preceding the crisis

What does that mean? So let us move on knowing 2020 will be bad with a likely double-digit fall in economic output.

Right Here, Right Now

This morning has brought the latest in the long-running official survey on the economy.

In July 2020, the business climate has continued its recovery started in May. The indicator that synthesizes it, calculated from the responses of business managers from the main market sectors, has gained 7 points. At 85, the business climate is however still significantly below its long-term average (100), and a fortiori below its relatively high pre-lockdown level (105).

The ending of the lockdown has seen a welcome rally of 7 points but sadly only to 85% of the long-term average. If we look back though I note it was recording a relatively high 105 which makes me mull this.

In Q1 2020, real gross domestic product (GDP)* fell sharply: -5.3% after -0.1% in Q4 2019, thus a revision of +0.5% compared with the first estimate published in April.

I think the relevant number is the contraction in the last quarter of 2019 and how does that relate to a relatively high reading. As the fall is only 0.1% we could argue the economy was flat lining but we still have a measure recording growth when there wasn’t any.

Going back to the survey we see a similar pattern but weaker number for employment.

In July 2020, the employment climate has continued to recover sharply from the April low. At 77, it has gained 10 points compared to June, but it still remains far below its pre-lockdown level.

Manufacturing

The position here is particularly bad.

According to the business managers surveyed in July 2020, the business climate in industry has continued to improve. The composite indicator has gained 4 points compared to June, after losing 30 points in April due to the health crisis. However, at 82, it remains far below its long term average (100).

Looking ahead the order book does not look exactly auspicious either.

In July 2020, slightly fewer industrialists than in June have declared their order books to be below normal. The balances of opinion on total and foreign order books have very slightly recovered. Both stand at very low levels although slightly higher than in 2009.

If we look back this measure had a recent peak around 112 as 2018 began. This represented quite a rally compared to the dips below 90 seen at times in 2012 and 13. But after that peak it began slip-sliding away to around 100 and now well you can see above.

Saving

Whilst debt hits the headlines the breakdown of the GDP data shows that it is not the only thing going on.

At the same time, household consumption fell (-5.6% after +0.3%), resulting in a sharp rise of the saving rate to 19.6% after 15.1% in Q4 2019.

The pandemic has seen higher levels of saving which has two drivers I think. Firstly many simply could not spend their money as so many outlets closed. Next those who can look like they have been indulging in some precautionary saving which is something of a disaster for supporters of negative interest-rates.

National Debt

Having just looked at ying here is part of the yang.

In Q1 2020 the public deficit increased by 1.1 points: 4.8% of GDP after 3.7% in Q4 2019.

So we see that pandemic France was borrowing more and regular readers will have noted this from past articles. For the year as a whole France had its nose pressed against the Growth and Stability Pact threshold of 3% of GDP. I know some of you measure an economy by tax receipts so they were 1.275 trillion in 2019.

Moving to the national debt we see this.

At the end of Q1 2020, Maastricht’s debt reached €2,438.5 billion, a €58.4 billion increase in comparison to Q4 2019. It accounted for 101.2% of gross domestic product (GDP), 3.1 points higher than last quarter, the highest increase since Q2 2019.

Looking ahead this is the view of the Bank of France.

As a result of the wider deficit and the fall in GDP, government debt should rise substantially to 119% of GDP in 2020, from 98.1% in 2019, and should scarcely decline over the rest of the projection horizon. The average debt-to-GDP ratio for the euro area should also increase in parallel, but to a more limited extent (to 101% of GDP in 2022, easing to 100% by end-2022).

Comment

There are some familiar patterns of a sharp drop in economic output followed by plenty of rhetoric about a sharp recovery next year. However the surveys we have looked at show a very partial recovery so far so that the “V-shaped” hopium users find themselves singing along with Bonnie Tyler.

I was lost in France
In the fields the birds were singing
I was lost in France
And the day was just beginning

Switching to the mounting debt burden it is a clear issue in terms of capital and if you like the weight of the debt. Also estimates of economies at around 120% of GDP went spectacularly wrong in the Euro area crisis. But in terms of debt costs then with a ten-year yield of -0.19% France is often being paid to issue debt. Although care is needed because the ECB does not buy ultra long bonds ( 30 years is its limit) meaning that France has a fifty-year bond yield of 0,58%. We should not forget that even the latter is very cheap, especially in these circumstances.

Also there is this from the head of the ECB Christine Lagarde.

In my interview with @IgnatiusPost

, I explained that price stability and climate change are closely related. Consequently, we must take climate-related risks into account in our central banking activities.

 

 

 

The ECB bails out the banks yet again, the Euro area economy not so much

One of the battles in economics is between getting data which is timely and it being accurate and reliable. Actually we struggle with the latter points full stop but especially if we try to produce numbers quickly. As regular readers will be aware we have been observing this problem in relation to the Markit Purchasing Manager Indices for several years now. They produce numbers which if this was a London gangster movie would be called “sharpish” but have missed the target on more than a few occasions and in he case of the Irish pharmaceutical cliff their arrow not only missed the target but the whole field as well.

Things start well as we note this.

The eurozone economic downturn eased markedly
for a second successive month in June as
lockdowns to prevent the spread of the coronavirus
disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak were further
relaxed, according to provisional PMI® survey data.
The month also saw a continued strong
improvement in business expectations for the year
ahead.

As it is from the 12th to the 22nd of this month it is timely as well but then things go rather wrong.

The flash IHS Markit Eurozone Composite PMI rose
further from an all-time low of 13.6 seen back in
April, surging to 47.5 in June from 31.9 in May. The
15.6-point rise was by far the largest in the survey
history with the exception of May’s record increase.
The latest gain took the PMI to its highest since
February, though still indicated an overall decline in
business output.

Actually these numbers if we note the Financial Times wrong-footed more than a few it would appear.

The rise in the eurozone flash Composite PMI in June confirms that economic output in the region is recovering rapidly from April’s nadir as restrictions are progressively eased. ( Capital Economics )

Today’s PMI numbers provide further evidence of what initially looks like a textbook V-shaped recovery. As much as more than a month of (full) lockdowns had sent economies into a standstill, the gradual reopenings of the last two months have led to a sharp rebound in activity. ( ING Di-Ba)

The latter is an extraordinary effort as a number below 50 indicates a further contraction albeit with a number of 47.5 a minor one. So we have gone enormous contraction , what would have been called an enormous contraction if they one before had not taken place and now a minor one. But the number now has to be over 50 as the economy picks up and this below is not true.

Output fell again in both manufacturing and
services, the latter showing the slightly steeper rate
of decline

On a monthly basis output rose as it probably did at the end of last month, it is just that it is doing so after a large fall. The one number which was positive was still way too low.

Flash France Composite Output Index) at 51.3
in June (32.1 in May), four-month high.

For what it is worth the overall view is as follows.

We therefore continue to expect GDP to slump by over 8% in 2020 and, while the recovery may start in the third quarter, momentum could soon fade meaning it will likely
take up to three years before the eurozone regains
its pre-pandemic level of GDP.

Actual Data

From Statistics Netherlands.

In May 2020, prices of owner-occupied dwellings (excluding new constructions) were on average 7.7 percent up on the same month last year. This price increase is higher than in the previous months.

Well that will cheer the European Central Bank or ECB. Indeed ECB President Lagarde may have a glass of champagne in response to this.

 In May 2020, house prices reached the highest level ever. Compared to the low in June 2013, house prices were up by 47.8 percent on average in that month.

Staying with the Netherlands and switching to the real economy we see this.

According to figures released by Statistics Netherlands (CBS), in April 2020 consumers spent 17.4 percent less than in April 2019. This is by far the largest contraction in domestic household consumption which has ever been recorded by CBS. Consumers mainly spent less on services, durable goods and motor fuels; on the other hand, they spent more on food, beverages and tobacco.

If we try to bring that up to date we see that if sentiment is any guide things have improved but are still weak.

At -27, the consumer confidence indicator in June stands far below its long-term average over the past two decades (-5). The indicator reached an all-time high (36) in January 2000 and an all-time low (-41) in March 2013.

Moving south to France we were told this earlier today.

In June 2020, the business climate has recovered very clearly, in connection with the acceleration of the lockdown exit. The indicator that synthesizes it, calculated from the responses of business managers from the main market sectors, has gained 18 points, its largest monthly increase since the start of the series (1980).

The jump is good news for the French economy although the rhetoric above does not match the detail.

At 78, the business climate has exceeded the low point reached in March 2009 (70), but remains far below its long-term average (100).

The situation is even worse for employment.

At 66, the employment climate still remains far below its May 2009 low (73), and, a fortiori, its long-term average (100).

Oh and staying with France I know some of you like to note these numbers.

At the end of Q1 2020, Maastricht’s debt reached €2,438.5 billion, a €58.4 billion increase in comparison to Q4 2019. It accounted for 101.2% of gross domestic product (GDP), 3.1 points higher than last quarter, the highest increase since Q2 2019.

Just as a reminder the UK measuring rod is different and tends to be around 4% of GDP lower. But of course both measures will be rising quickly in both France and the UK.

Comment

Let me now switch to a speech given earlier today by Philip Lane of the ECB.

 Euro area output contracted by a record 3.6 percent in the first quarter of the year and is projected to decline by a further 13 percent in the second quarter. While growth will partially rebound in the second half of this year, output is projected to return to the level prevailing at the end of 2019 only at the end of 2022.

In fact all of that is open to doubt as the first quarter numbers will be revised over time and as discussed above we do not know where we are right now. The forecasts are not realistic but manufactured to make other criteria such as the debt metrics look better than otherwise.

Also there is a real problem with the rhetoric below which is the cause of the policy change which was the Euro area economy slowing.

Thanks to the recalibration of our monetary policy measures announced in September 2019 – namely the cut in our deposit facility rate, enhanced forward guidance, the resumption of net asset purchases under the asset purchase programme (APP) and the easing of TLTRO III pricing – sizeable monetary accommodation was already in place when Europe was confronted with the COVID-19 shock.

As that was before this phase he is trying to hide the problem of having a gun from which nearly all the bullets have been fired. If we cut through the waffle what we are seeing are yet more banking subsidies.

The TLTRO programme complements our asset purchases and negative interest rate policy by ensuring the smooth transmission of the monetary policy stance through banks.

How much well here was @fwred last week.

ECB’s TLTRO-III.4 : €1308bn The Largest Longer Term Refinancing Operation ever………Banks look set to benefit, big time. All TLTRO-III will have an interest rate as low as -1% between Jun-20 and Jun-21, resulting in a gross transfer to banks of around €15bn. Most banks should qualify. Add tiering and here you are: from NIRP to a net transfer to banks!

So the banks get what they want which is interest-rate cuts to boost amongst other things their mortgage books which is going rather well in the Netherlands. Then when they overdose on negative interest-rates they are bailed out, unlike consumers and businesses. Another sign we live in a bankocracy.

Apparently the economy will win though says the judge,jury and er the defence and witness rather like in Blackadder.

An illustrative counterfactual exercise by ECB staff suggests that the TLTRO support in removing tail risk would be in the order of three percentage points of euro area real GDP growth in cumulative terms over 2020-22.

Austria

I nearly forgot to add that Austria is issuing another century bond today and yes I do mean 100 years. Even more extraordinary is that the yield looks set to be around 0.9%.

The Investing Channel

 

 

Eurobonds To be? Or not to be?

We find that some topics have a habit of recurring mostly because they never get quite settled, at least not to everyone’s satisfaction. At the time however triumph is declared as we enter a new era until reality intervenes, often quite quickly. So last night’s Franco-German announcement after a virtual summit caught the newswires.

France and Germany are proposing a €500bn ($545bn; £448bn) European recovery fund to be distributed to EU countries worst affected by Covid-19.

In talks on Monday, French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel agreed that the funds should be provided as grants.

The proposal represents a significant shift in Mrs Merkel’s position.

Mr Macron said it was a major step forward and was “what the eurozone needs to remain united”. ( BBC)

Okay and there was also this reported by the BBC.

Mrs Merkel, who had previously rejected the idea of nations sharing debt, said the European Commission would raise money for the fund by borrowing on the markets, which would be repaid gradually from the EU’s overall budget.

There are a couple of familiar features here as we see politicians wanted to spend now and have future politicians ( i.e not them face the issues of paying for it). There is an undercut right now in that the choice of Frau Merkel reminds those of us who follow bond markets that Germany is being paid to borrow with even its thirty-year yield being -0.05%. So in essence the other countries want a slice of that pie as opposed to hearing this from Germany.

Money, it’s a crime
Share it fairly but don’t take a slice of my pie
Money, so they say
Is the root of all evil today
But if you ask for a raise it’s no surprise that they’re
Giving none away, away, away ( Pink Floyd)

Actually France is often paid to borrow as well ( ten-year yield is -0.04%) but even it must be looking rather jealously at Germany.Here is how Katya Adler of the BBC summarised its significance.

Chancellor Merkel has conceded a lot. She openly agreed with the French that any money from this fund, allocated to a needy EU country, should be a grant, not a loan. Importantly, this means not increasing the debts of economies already weak before the pandemic.

President Macron gave ground, too. He had wanted a huge fund of a trillion or more euros. But a trillion euros of grants was probably too much for Mrs Merkel to swallow on behalf of fellow German taxpayers.

She has made a technical error, however, as Eurostat tends to allocate such borrowing to each country on the grounds of its ECB capital share. So lower borrowing for say Italy but not necessarily zero.

The ECB

Its President Christine Lagarde was quickly in the press.

So there is zero risk to the euro?

Yes. And I would remind you that the euro is irreversible, it’s written in the EU Treaty.

Of course history is a long list of treaties which have been reversed. Also there was the standard tactic when challenged on debt which is whataboutery.

Every country in the world is seeing its debt level increase – according to the IMF’s projections, the debt level of the United States will reach more than 130% of GDP by the end of this year, while the euro area’s debt will be below 100% of GDP.

Actually by trying to be clever there, she has stepped on something of a land mine. Let me hand you over to the French Finance Minister.

French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire said on Tuesday, the European Union (EU) recovery fund probably will not be available until 2021.

The 500 bln euro recovery fund idea is a historic step because it finances budget spending through debt, he added. ( FXStreet )

So the height of the pandemic and the economic collapse will be over before it starts? That is an issue which has dogged the Euro area response to not only this crisis but the Greek and wider Euro area one too. It is very slow moving and in the case of Greece by the time it upped its game we had seen the claimed 2% per annum economic growth morph into around a 10% decline meaning the boat had sailed. In economic policy there is always the issue of timing and in this instance whatever you think of the details of US policy for instance it has got on with it quickly which matters in a crisis.

Speaking of shooting yourself in the foot there was also this.

Growth levels and prevailing interest rates should be taken into account, as these are the two key elements.

The latter is true and as I pointed out earlier is a strength for many Euro area countries but the former has been quite a problem. Unless we see a marked change we can only expect the same poor to average performance going ahead. Mind you we did see a hint that her predecessor had played something of a Jedi Mind Trick on financial markets.

Outright Monetary Transactions, or OMTs, are an important instrument in the European toolbox, but they were designed for the 2011-12 crisis, which was very different from this one. I don’t think it is the tool that would be best suited to tackling the economic consequences of the public health crisis created by COVID-19.

They had success without ever being used.

Market Response

Things have gone rather well so far. The Euro has rallied versus the US Dollar towards 1.10 although it has dipped against the UK Pound. Bond markets are more clear cut with the Italian bond future rising over a point and a half to above 140 reducing its ten-year yield to 1.62%. The ten-year yield in Spain has fallen to 0.7% as well. It seems a bit harsh to include Spain after the economic growth spurt we have seen but nonetheless maybe it did not reach escape velocity.

Comment

Actually there already are some Eurobonds in that the ESM ( European Stability Mechanism) has issued bonds in the assistance programmes for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. Although they were secondary market moves mostly allowing countries to borrow more cheaply rather than spend more. On that subject I guess life can sometimes come at you fast as how is this going?

Taking into account these measures, the
government remains committed to meeting the
primary fiscal surplus for 2020 and forecasts a
primary surplus at  3.6% of GDP ( Greece Debt Office)

On the other side of the coin it will be grateful for this.

81% of the debt stock is held by official sector creditors,
allowing for long term maturity profile and low interest
rates

On a Greek style scale the 500 billion Euros is significant but now we switch to Italy we see that suddenly the same sum of money shrinks a lot. I notice that Five Star ( political party not the band) have already been on the case.

It’s just too little, too late
A little too long
And I can’t wait ( JoJo)

This brings me to the two real issues here of which the first is generic. In its history fiscal policy finds that it can not respond quickly enough which is why the “first responder” is monetary policy. The problem is that the ECB has done this so much it is struggling to do much more and the European Union is always slow to use fiscal policy. Such as it has then the use has been in the other direction via the Stability and Growth Pact.

Next comes the fact that there are 19 national treasuries to deal with for the Euro and 27 for the European Union as I note that last night’s deal was between only 2 of them. Perhaps the most important ones but only 2.

What to do when we do not know GDP,Inflation or even Unemployment levels?

Today has brought a whole raft of data for our attention and much of it is eye-catching. So let is begin with La Belle France a subject on my mind after watching the film Waterloo last night.

In Q1 2020, GDP in volume terms fell sharply: –5.8%, the biggest drop in the series’ record, since 1949. In particular, it is bigger than the ones recorded in Q1 2009 (–1.6%) or in Q2 1968 (–5.3%). ( Insee )

I have to confess I am a little in the dark as to 1968 and can only think it may have been related to the student riots of the era. The Covid-19 vibe is established by the way that domestic demand plunged.

Household consumption expenditures dropped (–6.1%), as did total gross fixed capital formation in a more pronounced manner (GFCF: –11.8%). Overall, final domestic demand excluding inventory changes fell sharply: it contributed to –6.6 points to GDP growth.

I guess no-one is going to be surprised by this either.

Overall production of goods and services declined sharply (–5.5%). It fell the hardest in construction (–12,6%), while output in goods declined –4.8% and output in manufactured goods dropped –5.6%. Output in market services declined by –5.7% overall.

Such production as there was seems to have piled up.

Conversely, changes in inventories contributed positively to GDP growth (+0.9 points).

At a time like this GDP really struggles to deal with trade so let me use France as an example on the way to explaining the issue.

Exports also fell this quarter (–6.5%) along with imports (–5.9%), in a less pronounced manner. All in all, the foreign trade balance contributed negatively to GDP growth: –0.2 points, after –0.1 points the previous quarter.

As you can see the net effect here is rather small especially in these circumstances. But there is a lot going on as we see large moves in both exports and imports. Another way of looking at this is provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in the US.

Imports, which are a subtraction in the calculation of GDP, decreased

A lot less detail for a start. Let me help out as imports in the US fell heavily by US $140.1 billion in fact and exports only fell by US $56.9 billion. So net exports rose by US $83.3 billion and boosted the numbers. This is really awkward when a signal that the US is doing badly raises GDP by 2.32% on its own and in net terms by 1.3% ( care is needed with US numbers because they are annualised).

So here is a major caveat that the US may appear to be doing better but the trade breakdown hints strongly things are much worse than that.

Spain

Spain had been having a good run but sadly that is now over.

Spanish GDP registers a -5.2% variation in the first quarter of 2020 compared to the previous quarter in terms of volume. This rate is 5.6 points less than the Registered in the fourth quarter. ( INE)

The chart is quite extraordinary as the good run since around 2014 is replaced by quite a plummet. We see that it is essentially a domestic game as like France the international factor small.

For its part, external demand presents a contribution of 0.2 points, three tenths lower than that of the previous quarter.

We do get a hint of what is about to hit the labour market and indeed unemployment which had remained high in Spain.

The employment of the economy, in terms of hours worked, registers a variation of ,5.0% compared to the previous quarter.

Inflation

Let me return to France to illustrate the issues here.

Over a year, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) should rise by 0.4% in April 2020, after +0.7% in the previous month, according to the provisional estimate made at the end of the month. This drop in inflation should result from an accentuated fall in energy prices and a sharp slowdown in service prices.

A problem leaps off the page and ironically they have unintentionally described it

an accentuated fall in energy prices

That is because the weight for energy is too high as for example factories stopped work and there was much less commuting. Then there is this.

Food prices should rebound sharply, due to a strong rise in fresh food product prices.

Fresh food prices rose by 18.1% in March but are weighted at a mere 2.3% as opposed to the 8.1% of energy, when we know that there was heavy demand to stock up. I do not wish to demean their efforts but the claim that other food prices rose by 1.4% compared to 2.3% this time last year looks dodgy and may well be suffering from this

The price collection carried out by collectors on the field (about 40% in the CPI) has been suspended since 16 March:

Also it was a rough month for smokers as tobacco rose by 13.7%.

If we look at Spain we see the energy/fuel problem emerge again.

The preliminary data that is presented today through the leading indicator of the CPI, places its annual variation at –0.7% in April, seven tenths below that registered in March, influenced for the most part by the drop in fuel prices and fuels, compared to the increase registered in 2019.

Also with food prices albeit it on a lower scale.

It is remarkable the behavior of food prices, whose annual rate passes from 2.5% in March to 4.0% in April. Of these, fresh food reaches a rate of 6.9%, three points above that of the previous month, and packaged foods, place their annual rate at 2.2%, six tenths above that of March.

Although to be fair to INE in Spain they are trying to adapt to the new reality.

the prices of the products included in the goods special group COVID-19 increased 1.2% in April, compared to the previous month. While the services COVID-19 decreased 1.4% in April compared to March.

Unemployment

This may well be the biggest statistical fail I have seen in the world of economics.

In March 2020, in comparison with the previous month, employment slightly decreased and unemployment sharply fell together with a relevant increase of inactivity.

Yes you did read the latter part correctly.

In the last month, also the remarkable fall of the unemployed people (-11.1%, -267 thousand) was
recorded for both men (-13.4%, -169 thousand) and women (-8.6%, -98 thousand). The unemployment
rate dropped to 8.4% (-0.9 percentage points) and the youth rate fell to 28.0% (-1.2 p.p.).

They had two issues to contend with but tripped over a theoretical flaw. The issues were having to do the survey by telephone and a sample size some 20% lower. The flaw is that to be unemployed you have to be available for work and in this situation I am sure many reported that they were not. Indeed you can see this below.

In the last three months, also the number of unemployed persons decreased (-5.4%, -133 thousand), while
a growth among inactive people aged 15-64 years was registered (+1.5%, +192 thousand)……..On a yearly basis, the decrease of employed people was accompanied by a fall of unemployed persons
(-21.1%, -571 thousand) and a growth of inactive people aged 15-64 (+4.4%, +581 thousand).

Comment

I summarised the situation on social media yesterday.

Reasons not to trust the US GDP print

1. Advance estimates only have ~50% of the full data

2. Inflation estimates will be nearly hopeless at a time like this.

3. Output of say planes for no one to fly in them has obvious issues….

Let me add a fourth which is the impact of imports that I have described above.

Switching to the unemployment numbers from Italy I do not blame those compiling the numbers and find them helpful when I have an enquiry. But someone higher up the chain should at least have put a large warning on these numbers and maybe even stopped their publication as statistics are supposed to inform not mislead. They seem to have taken Talking Heads a little too literally.

Stop making sense
Quit talking
Stop making sense
Start falling
Stop making sense
Hold onto me
You’re always at your best
When you’re not making sense

Me on The Investing Channel

The first business surveys about this economic depression appear

This morning has seen the first actual signals of the scale of the economic slow down going on. One of the problems with official economic data is the  time lag before we get it and this has been exacerbated by the fact that this has been an economic contraction on speed ( LSD). By the time they tell us how bad it has been we may be in quite a different world! It is always a battle between accuracy and timeliness for economic data. Thus eyes will have turned to the business surveys released this morning.

Do ya do ya do ya do ya
Ooh I’m looking for clues
Ooh I’m looking for clues
Ooh I’m looking for clues ( Robert Palmer)

Japan

The main series began in Japan earlier and brace yourselves.

#Japan‘s economic downturn deepens drastically in March, dragged down by a sharp contraction in the service sector, according to #PMI data as #coronavirus outbreak led to plummeting tourism, event cancellations and supply chain disruptions. ( IHS Markit )

The composite output index was at 35.8 which indicates an annualised fall in GDP ( Gross Domestic Product) approaching 8% should it continue. There was a split between manufacturing ( 44.8) and services ( 32.7) but not the way we have got used to. The manufacturing number was the worst since April 2009 and the services one was the worst since the series began in 2007.

France

Next in the series came La Belle France and we needed to brace ourselves even more.

March Flash France PMI suggest GDP is collapsing at an annualised rate approaching double digits, with the Composite Output PMI at an all-time low of 30.2 (51.9 – Feb). Both services and manufacturers recorded extreme drops in output on the month.

There was more to come.

French private sector activity contracted at the
sharpest rate in nearly 22 years of data collection
during March, amid widespread business closures
due to the coronavirus outbreak.

There are obvious fears about employment and hence unemployment.

Amid falling new orders, private sector firms cut
their staff numbers for the first time in nearly threeand-a-half years during March. Moreover, the rate
of reduction was the quickest since April 2013.

I also noted this as I have my concerns about inflation as the Ivory Towers work themselves into deflation mode one more time.

Despite weaker demand conditions, supply
shortages drove input prices higher in March…….with
manufacturers raising output prices for the first time
in three months

We could see disinflation in some areas with sharp inflation in others.

Germany

Next up was Germany and by now investors were in the brace position.

The headline Flash Germany
Composite PMI Output Index plunged from 50.7 in
February to 37.2, its lowest since February 2009.
The preliminary data were based on responses
collected between March 12-23.

This led to this analysis.

“The unprecedented collapse in the PMI
underscores how Germany is headed for recession,
and a steep one at that. The March data are
indicative of GDP falling at a quarterly rate of
around 2%, and the escalation of measures to
contain the virus outbreak mean we should be
braced for the downturn to further intensify in the
second quarter.”

You may be thinking that this is better than the ones above but there is a catch. Regular readers will recall that due to a problem in the way it looks at supply this series has inflated the German manufacturing data. This has happened again.

The headline Flash Germany
Manufacturing PMI sank to 45.7, though it was
supported somewhat by a further increase in
supplier delivery times – the most marked since
July 2018 – and a noticeably slower fall in stocks of
purchases, both linked to supply-side disruption

So the truth is that the German numbers are closer to France once we allow for this. We also see the first signals of trouble in the labour markets.

After increasing – albeit marginally – in each of the
previous four months, employment across
Germany’s private sector returned to contraction in
March. The decline was the steepest since May
2009 and was underpinned by similarly sharp drops
in workforce numbers across both manufacturing
and services.

Also we note a continuing pattern where services are being hit much harder than manufacturing, Of course manufacturing had seen a rough 2019 but services have essentially plunged at a rapid rate.

The Euro Area

We do not get much individual detail but you can see that the other Euro area nations are doing even worse.

The rest of the euro area reported an even
steeper decline than seen in both France and
Germany, led by comfortably the sharpest fall in
service sector activity ever recorded, though
manufacturing output also shrank at the steepest
rate for almost 11 years.

I am trying hard to think of PMI numbers in the 20s I have seen before.

Flash Eurozone Services PMI Activity Index(2)
at 28.4 (52.6 in February). Record low (since
July 1998)

Putting it all together we get this.

The March PMI is indicative of GDP slumping at a
quarterly rate of around 2%,

The UK

Our numbers turned up to a similar drum beat and bass line.

At 37.1 in March, down from 53.0 in February, the seasonally adjusted IHS Markit / CIPS Flash UK Composite Output Index – which is based on approximately 85% of usual monthly replies – signalled the fastest downturn in private sector business activity since the series began in January 1998. The prior low of 38.1 was seen in November 2008.

This was supported by the manufacturing PMI being at 48 but it looks as though we have at least some of the issues at play in the German number too.

Longer suppliers’ delivery times are typically seen as an
advance indicator of rising demand for raw materials and
therefore have a positive influence on the Manufacturing PMI index.

The numbers added to the household finances one from IHS Markit yesterday.

UK consumers are already feeling the financial pinch of
coronavirus, according to the IHS Markit UK Household Finance Index. With the country on the brink of lockdown during the survey collection dates (12-17 March), surveyed households reported the largest degree of pessimism towards job security in over eight years,
with those employed in entertainment and manufacturing sectors deeming their jobs to be at the most risk.

Comment

So we have the first inklings of what is taking place in the world economy and we can add it to the 40.7 released by Australia yesterday. However we need a note of caution as these numbers have had troubles before and the issue over the treatment of suppliers delivery times is an issue right now. Also it does not appear to matter if your PMI is 30 or 37 we seem to get told this.

The March PMI is indicative of GDP slumping at a
quarterly rate of around 2%,

Now I am slightly exaggerating because they have said 1.5% to 2% for the UK but if we are there then France and the Euro area must be more like 3% and maybe worse if the series is to be consistent.

Next I thought I would give you some number-crunching from Japan.

TOKYO (Reuters) – The Bank of Japan on Tuesday acknowledged unrealized losses of 2-3 trillion yen ($18-$27 billion) on its holdings of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) after a rout in Japanese stock prices, raising the prospect it could post an annual loss this year.

Our To Infinity! And Beyond! Theme has been in play for The Tokyo Whale and the emphasis is mine.

Its stock purchase started at a pace of one trillion yen per year in 2013 when the Nikkei was around 12,000. The buying expanded to 3 trillion yen in 2014 and to 6 trillion yen in 2016, ostensibly to boost economic growth and lift inflation, but many investors view the policy as direct intervention to prop up share prices.

Surely not! But the taxpayer may be about to get a warning of sorts.

The unrealized loss of 2-3 trillion yen would wipe out about 1.7 trillion yen of recurring profits the BOJ is estimated to make this year from interest payments on its massive bond holdings, said Hiroshi Ugai, senior economist at J.P. Morgan.

For today that will be on the back burner as the Nikkei 225 equity index rose 7% to just above 18,000 which means that its purchases of over 200 billion Yen yesterday will be onside at least as we note the “clip size” has nearly trebled for The Tokyo Whale.

 

 

The ECB is now resorting to echoing Humpty Dumpty

Focus has shifted to the Euro area this week as we see that something of an economic storm is building. For a while now we have seen the impact of the trade war which has reduced the Germany economy to a crawl with economic growth a mere 0.4% over the past year. Then both Italy (0.3%) and France ( 0.1%) saw contractions in the final quarter of 2019. Now in an example of being kicked when you are down one of the worst outbreaks of Corona Virus outside of China is being seen in Italy. Indeed the idea of Austria stopping a train with people from Italy suspected of having the virus posed a question for one of the main tenets of the Euro area as well as reminding of the film The Cassandra Crossing.

Tourism

This is a big deal for Italy as The Local explained last summer.

Announcing the new findings, ENIT chief Giorgio Palmucci said tourism accounted for 13 percent of Italy’s gross domestic product.

The food and wine tourism sector continued to be the most profitable of all.

The study’s authors found that “the daily per capita expenditure for a food and wine holiday is in fact in our country is about 117 euros. Meanwhile it was 107 for trips to the mountains and 91 on the coast.”

The numbers were for 2017 and were showing growth but sadly if we look lower on the page we come to a sentence that now rather stands out.

Visitor numbers are only expected to keep growing. Many in the tourism industry predict 2019 will busier than ever in Italy, partly thanks to a growing Chinese tourism market.

Maybe so, but what about 2020? There have to be questions now and Italy is not the only country which does well from tourism.

Tourism plays a major role in the French economy. The accommodation and food  services sector, representing the largest part of the tourism sector, accounts for between
2.5% and 3% of GDP while the knock-on effects of tourism are also felt in other sectors, such as transport and leisure. Consequently, the total amount of internal tourism
consumption, which combines tourism-related spending by both French residents and non-residents, represents around 7.5% of GDP (5% for residents, 2.5% for non-residents). ( OECD)

Spain

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contribution associated with tourism, measured through the total tourist demand, reached 137,020 million euros in 2017. This figure represented 11.7% of GDP, 0.4% more than in 2016. ( INE )

Last summer Kathimerini pointed out that tourism was not only a big part of the Greek economy but was a factor in its recent improvement.

Tourism generates over a quarter of Greece’s gross domestic product, according to data presented on Wednesday by the Institute of the Greek Tourism Confederation (INSETE). The data highlight the industry’s importance to the national economy and employment, as well as tourism’s quasi-monopolistic status in the country’s growth.

According to the latest figures available, at least one percentage point out of the 1.9 points of economic expansion last year came from tourism.

It wondered whether Greece relied on it too much which I suspect many more are worried about today, although fortunately Greece has only had one case of Corona Virus so far. It not only badly needs some good news but deserves it. After all another big sector for it will be affected by wider virus problems.

That also illustrates the country’s great dependence on tourism, as Greece has not developed any other important sector, with the possible exception of shipping, which accounts for about 7 percent of GDP.

Economic Surveys

Italy has released its official version this morning.

As for the business confidence climate, the index (IESI, Istat Economic Sentiment Indicator) improved passing from 99.2 to 99.8.

That for obvious reasons attracts attention and if we look we see there may be a similar problem as we saw on the Markit IHS survey for Germany.

The confidence index in manufacturing increased only just from 100.0 to 100.6. Among the series included
into the definition of the climate, the opinions on order books bettered from -15.5 to -14.3 while the
expectations on production decreased from 5.6 to 4.7

As you can see the expectations  for production have fallen. Perhaps we should note that this index averaged 99.5 in the last quarter of 2019 when the economy shrank by 0.3%

France had something similar yesterday.

In February 2020, households’ confidence in the economic situation has been stable. The synthetic index has stayed at 104, above its long-term average (100).

This continued a theme begun on Tuesday.

In February 2020, the business climate is stable. At 105, the composite indicator, compiled from the answers of business managers in the main market sectors, is still above its long-term mean (100). Compared to January, the business climate has gained one point in retail trade and in services.

Really? This is a long-running set of surveys but we seem to be having a divorce from reality because if we return to household confidence I note that consumption fell in December.

Household consumption expenditure on goods fell in December (–0.3%) but increased over the fourth quarter (+0.4%).

Money Supply

This may give us a little clue to the surveys above. From the ECB earlier.

Annual growth rate of narrower monetary aggregate M1, comprising currency in circulation and overnight deposits, stood at 7.9% in January, compared with 8.0% in December.

Whilst the number has dipped recently from the two 8.4% readings we saw in the latter part of 2019 it is much better than the 6.2% recorded last January. So maybe the surveys are in some sense picking an element of that up as the interest-rate cut and recommencement of QE bond buying feeds into the data.

Comment

If we switch to the ECB looking for clues as to what is happening in the economy then I would suggests it discounts heavily what the European Commission has just released.

In February 2020, the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI) increased in both the euro area (by 0.9 points to 103.5) and the EU (by 0.5 points to 103.0).

 

 

That does not fit with this at all.

GERMANY’S VDA SAYS CORONAVIRUS IS AFFECTING SUPPLY CHAINS OF CAR MANUFACTURERS AND SUPPLIERS ( @PriapusIQ )

Anyway the newly appointed Isabel Schnabel of the ECB has been speaking today and apparently it is a triumph that its policies have stabilised economic growth somewhere around 0%.

Although the actions of major central banks over the past few years have succeeded in easing financial conditions and thereby stabilising growth and inflation, current and expected inflation rates remain stubbornly below target, in spite of years of exceptional monetary policy support.

Next she sings along with The Chairmen of the Board.

Give me just a little more time
And our love will surely grow
Give me just a little more time
And our love will surely grow

How?

This implies that the medium-term horizon over which the ECB pursues the sustainable alignment of inflation with its aim is considerably longer than in the past.

Another case of To Infinity! And Beyond! Except on this occasion we are addressing time rather than the amount of the operation which no doubt will be along soon enough.

Indeed she echoes Alice in Wonderland with this.

For the ECB, this means that the length of the “medium term” – which is an integral part of its definition of price stability – will vary over time.

Which sounds rather like.

When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.” “The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.” “The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.”

Although briefly she seems to have some sort of epiphany.

central banks often have only a limited understanding of the precise configuration of the forces

But it does not last and as ever I expect the result to be even lower interest-rates and more QE as the “lower bound” she mentions gets well er lower again.

Some of this is beyond the ECB’s control as there is not much it can do about a trade war and nothing about a virus outbreak. But by interfering in so many areas it has placed itself in the game and is caught in a trap of its own making. Or returning to The Chairmen of the Board.

There’s no need to act foolishly
If we part our hearts won’t forget it
Years from now we’ll surely regret it

Worrying signs for the economy of France as the manufacturing downturn bites

Today has opened with some troubling news for the economy of France and the area driving this will not be a surprise. The official confidence survey series has produced this headline.

In October 2019, the business climate has deteriorated in the manufacturing industry

This is a sign that the problems we see in so much of the world have been hitting France and there has been a particularly rapid deterioration this month.

According to the business managers surveyed in October 2019, the business climate in industry has deteriorated compared to September. The composite indicator has lost three points to 99, moving just below its long term average (100).

If we look back at this series we see that it peaked at 113,5 back in February 2018 and is now at 99.4 so quite a decline which has now moved it below its long-term average, This matters as it is a long-running series and of course 100 for manufacturing means relative decline.

If we look for specific areas of weakness we find these.

In the manufacture of equipment goods, the business climate has lost three points and moved below its long-term average (97). In the in the electrical equipment and in the machinery and equipment branches, the balances of opinion have get worse, more sharply than in September, to stand significantly below their average.

And also these.

The business climate has deteriorated in almost all subsectors, particularly in chemicals where the deterioration is the most significant. In this subsector, as in basic metals, the business climate indicator stands largely below its long-term average.

Maybe a little surprisingly this area seems to be hanging in there.

In the manufacture of transport equipment, the business climate indicator has lost two points in October, after a stability in the previous month, and stands slightly below its long-term average.

That is in spite of this.

The climate indicator has decreased again in the automotive industry and has practically returned to the low point of July. The balance of opinion on general production prospects contributes the most sharply to this deterioration.

They do not say it but the motor industry has fallen to 91.

On the other side of the coin the computing and optical sector seems to be improving.

If we bring it all together then there are concerns for other economic measures from this.

Considering employment, the balances opinion on their past variation and perspectives have declined slightly. Both indicators stand however largely above their long-term average.

That does not seem set to last and for what it is worth ( it is volatile) there is also this.

The turning-point indicator has moved down into the area indicating an uncertain economic outlook.

For context the official output series has been telling us this.

In August 2019, output diminished in the manufacturing industry (−0.8%, after +0.4%)……..Over the last three months, output declined in manufacturing industry (−1.2%)……Manufacturing output of the last three months got worse compared to the same three months of 2018 (−0.8%),

That was something of a troika as all three ways of measuring the situation showed falls.

Is it spreading to other sectors?

So far the services sector is not only ignoring this it is doing rather well.

According to business managers surveyed in October 2019, the business climate in services is stable. At 106, it stands well above its long-term average (100).

The only real flicker is here.

More business managers than in July have reported demand difficulties only.

Construction is apparently continuing the boom which began in 2015.

According to the business managers in the building construction industry surveyed in October 2019, the business climate is stable. The composite indicator stands at 112, its highest level since May 2008, largely above its long-term average (100).

This brings me to the official forecast for economic growth from the beginning of the month.

However, the macroeconomic scenario for France remains virtually unchanged since the June 2019 Conjoncture in France report (with projected growth of +0.3% each quarter through to the end of the year, and +1.3% as an annual average in 2019.

The problems you see are all the fault of whatever is French for Johnny Foreigner.

The international economic environment is deteriorating, due to a combination of several factors: protectionist pressures, uncertainties surrounding Brexit, doubts about the orientation of economic policies in certain countries, etc. Growth forecasts for most of France’s economic partners are therefore revised downwards.

Indeed their statisticians seem to abandon European unity and indulge in some trolling.

These international shocks have had a more negative impact on economic activity in Germany than in France. Indeed, growth in Germany stagnated in the spring (–0.1% after +0.4%), with the weakening of international trade and the slowdown in corporate investment hitting industry much harder than services.

If only German had a word for that. Meanwhile this bit just seems cruel.

Italian economic growth has remained almost non-existent for more than a year (0.0% in Q2 after +0.1% in Q1).

Monetary Policy

Here we go.

the European Central Bank (ECB) extended its highly accommodating monetary policy in September, among other things by lowering the deposit rate and resuming its bond purchases as of November 2019 for a total of €20 billion per month.

I like the way they have cottoned onto my idea that markets mostly respond to QE before it happens and sometimes quite a bit before.

As a result, Eurozone sovereign yields entered negative territory (in the spring for the German ten-year yield and in the summer for the French yield).

Fiscal Policy

There is a clue above that there have been ch-ch-changes. That is represented by the ten-year yield in France being -0.1% as I type this. Borrowing is not a complete freebie as the thirty-year yield is 0.7% but ECB policy ( 420 billion Euros of French government bonds and about to rise) means France can borrow very cheaply.

France is taking more of an advantage of this than my country the UK because it borrowed at an annual rate of 3,5% of GDP in the first quarter of the year and 3.4% in the second. Contrary to much of the official rhetoric we see rises of the order of 1% of GDP here so we can see how domestic demand in the economy has been “resilient”. It is also presumably a response to the Gilet Jaunes issue.

France in debt terns is quite tight on a big figure change and Japan excepted the big figure change as the debt to GDP ratio was 99.6% at the end of June. It will be under pressure from the extra borrowing and thus very dependent on economic growth remaining to stay under 100%.

The number being like that explains why the Governor of the Bank of France diverted us somewhat when he was in New York a week ago.

The euro area has a lower level of public debt (85%) than in the United-States (104 %) or the UK (87%),

Actually the UK is in fact below 85% so it was not his finest hour.

Comment

Today’s journey brings us two main themes. The first is that the French economy has been boosted by some extra government spending. This is in stark contrast to Germany which is running a fiscal surplus. But the ~1% of GDP increase seems to have got a little lost in translation as economic growth has only been ~0.6% so far. However it is a case for counter cyclical fiscal policy as otherwise the French economy may have contracted.

Now we see signs of a downwards turn in the already weakened manufacturing sector which poses a problem with fiscal policy already pushing the boundaries of the Maastricht rules. Also if we look deeper I find this deeply troubling from the Governor of the Bank of France.

Despite this gloomy context, the French economy is resilient, with growth at 1.3% close to its potential.

This is a reference to what is the new central banking standard of annual GDP growth having something of a speed limiter at 1.5%. Let me give you two problems with it. Firstly they seem to get a free pass as to their role in this as one of the biggest changes has been their own actions. Secondly it ignores countries like Spain which may now be slower but have in recent times done much better than this.

 

 

 

 

What can we expect next from the economy of France?

During the Euro area slow down France has mostly been able to avoid the limelight. This is because it has at least managed some economic growth at a time when Germany not always has. It may not be stellar growth but at least there has been some.

In Q2 2019, GDP in volume terms grew at the same pace as in the previous quarter: +0.3% (revised by +0.1% from the first estimate).

However  there are questions going forwards which plugs into the general Euro area problem which got a further nudge on Monday.

The IHS Markit Eurozone Composite PMI® fell to
50.4 in September according to the ‘flash’ estimate,
down from 51.9 in August to signal the weakest
expansion of output across manufacturing and
services since June 2013………The survey data indicate that GDP looks set to rise by just 0.1% in the third quarter, with momentum weakening as the quarter closed.

As you can see growth is fading and may now have stopped if the PMI is any guide and this was reflected in the words of the Governor of the Bank of France in Paris yesterday.

For the past ten years, there is little doubt that ECB monetary policy under Mario Draghi’s Presidency has made a decisive contribution not only to safeguarding the euro in 2012, but also to the significant recovery of the euro area since 2013. Over this period, more than 10 million jobs have been created. Our unconventional measures are estimated to add almost 2 percentage points of growth and of inflation between 2016 and 2020.

It is revealing that no mention is made of growth right now as he concentrates on what he considers to be past glories. He has rounded the numbers up too as they are 1.5% and 1.9% respectively. Let me give him credit for one thing though which is this although I would like him to say this to the wider public as well.

Since I am talking to an audience of researchers I should of course emphasise that such numbers are subject to uncertainty.

Also raising inflation in the current environment of weak wage growth is likely to make people worse and not better off.

France

The situation here was better than the Euro area average but still slowed.

At 51.3 in September, the IHS Markit Flash France
Composite Output Index fell from 52.9 in August,
and pointed to the softest expansion in private sector
activity for four months.

Actually manufacturing is doing okay in grim times with readings of 49.7 and 50.3 suggesting flatlining. The real fear here was that the larger services sector is now being sucked lower by it.

However, with services firms registering their
slowest rise in activity since May, fears of negative
spill over effects from the manufacturing sector are
coming to fruition. Any intensification of such effects
would likely dampen economic growth going
forward.

This leaves me mulling the record of Markit in France as several years ago it was criticised for being too pessimistic by the French government and more recently seems to have swung the other way.

What about fiscal policy?

This did get a mention in the speech by the Governor of the Bank of France yesterday.

Failing that, a second answer is for fiscal policy to step in. Fiscal stimulus from countries with fiscal space would both stimulate aggregate demand, and, with targeted, quality investment, increase long-term growth.

The problem with that argument is that even the French run IMF could not avoid pointing out this in July.

France’s public debt has been consistently rising over the last four decades, increasing by 80 percent of GDP since the 1980s to reach close to 100 percent of GDP at end-2018. This reflects the inability of successive governments to take full advantage of good times to reverse the spending increases undertaken during downturns.

Actually some of the IMF suggestions look rather chilling and perhaps in Orwellian language.

rationalizing spending on medical products and hospital services; improving the allocation of resources in education

Also and somewhat typically the IMF has missed one change in the situation which is that at present France is being paid to borrow. It’s ten-year yield went negative at the beginning of July and has mostly been there since. As I type this it is -0.32%. It still has to pay a little for longer terms ( the thirty-year is 0.48%) but as you can see not much.

So the situation is that France does have quite a lot of relatively expensive debt from the past but could borrow now very cheaply if it chose to do so.

Banks

Whilst he s referring to macroprudential policy it is hard not to have a wry smile at this from the Governor of the Bank of France.

 To start with, as of today, our toolkit is very much bank-centric.

Especially when he add this.

We are making some progress to extend macroprudential policy beyond the banking sector.

Returning to the banks they are just like elsewhere.

PARIS (Reuters) – Societe Generale (SOGN.PA) plans to cut 530 jobs in France by 2023, CGT union said in a statement.

Of course BNP Paribas has been taking some brokerage business and employees from Deutsche Bank although it has not be a complete success according to financemagnate.com.

Deutsche’s clients will receive letters explaining how the transfer will work. However, some of them have already moved to competitors such as Barclays, which has won roughly $20 billion in prime brokerage balances.

In a way the French banks have used Deutsche Bank as a shield. But many of the same questions are in existence here. How are they going to make sustained profits in a world of not much economic growth and negative interest-rates?

Unemployment

This is the real achilles heel of the French economy. From Insee

The ILO unemployment rate decreased by 0.2 points on average in Q2 2019, after a 0.1 points fall in the first quarter. It stood at 8.5% of the labour force in France (excluding Mayotte), 0.6 points below its Q2 2018 level and its lowest level since early 2009.

Whilst the falls are welcome it is the level of unemployment and the fact it is only now approaching the pre credit crunch levels which are the issue as well as this.

Over the quarter, the employment rate among the youth diminished (−0.3 points),

Whilst the unemployment rate for youth fell by 0.6% to 18.6% it is still high and the falling employment rate is not the best portent for the future.

Comment

So far the economy of France has managed to bumble on and unlike the UK and Germany avoided any quarterly contractions in economic output. If you look at this morning’s official survey then apparently the only way is up baby.

In September 2019, households’ confidence in the economic situation has increased for the ninth consecutive month. At 104, the synthetic index remains above its long-term average (100), reaching its highest level since January 2018.

Perhaps the fall in unemployment has helped and a small rise in real wages. The latter are hard to interpret as a change at the opening of the year distorted the numbers.

firms might pay a special bonus for purchasing power (PEPA) in the first quarter of 2019, to employees earning less than 3 times the minimal wage.

According to the official survey published yesterday businesses are becoming more optimistic too.

In September 2019, the business climate has gained one point, compared to August. The composite indicator, compiled from the answers of business managers in the main sectors, stands at 106, above its long-term mean (100)

So there you have it everything except for the official surveys points downwards. In their defence the official surveys have been around for a long time. So let me leave you with some trolling by the Bank of France monthly review.

French economic growth has settled into a fairly stable pace since mid-2018 of between 1.2% and 1.4% year-on-year . France has thus demonstrated greater resilience than other euro area economies, particularly Germany, where year-on-year growth only amounted to 0.4% in mid-2019. This growth rate should continue over the coming quarters: based on Banque de France business surveys published on 9 September, we expect quarter-on-quarter GDP growth in the third quarter of 2019 of 0.3%.

Rethinking The Dollar

I did an interview for this website. Apologies if you have any issues with the sound as the technology failed us a little and we had to switch from my laptop to my tablet.