Where next for interest-rates and bond yields?

2021 has opened by reminding us that the world has become increasingly bi-polar.Perhaps I should refine that to the human world. Prospects for interest-rates are doing that as well and let me give you an example of one trend.

Government bond #yield keeping higher: 10 year German #Bund yield at -0.48%, 10 year UK Treasury #Gilt yield at 0.32% and 10 year US #Treasury yield at 1.15%. (@CIMBank_News)

The player here is the United States. I noted yesterday the impact of higher US bond yields on the price of Gold and in the meantime the ten-year has nudged higher to 1.15%. Part of this has been caused by the way that the prospects for Yield Curve Control ( essentially more QE bond buying) have collided with this.

WASHINGTON (Reuters) – The Federal Reserve could begin to trim its monthly asset purchases this year if distribution of coronavirus vaccines boosts the economy as expected, Atlanta Fed President Raphael Bostic said on Monday in what amounted to a bullish outlook for the coming months.

As you can see they have been talking bond yields higher just as they were expected to be heading in the opposite direction. So much for Forward Guidance! This is more like a car crash as we wait for the handbrake turn. Just to add to the land of confusion there was also this.

In separate comments, Chicago Fed President Charles Evans also said policymakers were poised to push bond-buying in either direction – adding more if the economy seems to need it but also open to cutting back if the recovery and vaccines gain traction. ( Reuters)

On a technical level this just reminds us how useless Forward Guidance is. We have seen central bankers and their acolytes push it as a policy tool but right now they are pulling in every direction. How can anyone take guidance from this.

Mr and Mrs Market have decided to push bond yields higher and see if they break.Those who remember what was called the Taoer Tantrum and the climb down of the US Federal Reserve in the face of pressure from President Trump will no doubt be thinking when they climb down. Such thoughts are no doubt behind the rise in bond yields because so far QE has been an example of the genius of the song Hotel California.

“Relax”, said the night man
“We are programmed to receive
You can check out any time you like
But you can never leave”

Negative Interest-Rates

On the other side of the coin is the negative interest-rate enthusiast of the Bank of England Silvana Tenreyro. Yesterday she gave a speech setting out her views on them.

Financial-market channels appear to be unimpeded under negative rates, and some may even be
stronger than usual.
 While pass-through to household deposit rates can be constrained near zero, pass-through appears
to be less constrained for corporate deposit rates, which may stimulate spending by firms.
 There is strong evidence of transmission into looser bank lending conditions, even if this is
somewhat constrained relative to ‘normal’.
 There is no clear evidence that negative rates have reduced bank profits overall, and a number of
studies find positive impacts, once you take into account the boost to the economy.
 Taking these points together, the evidence suggests that negative rates can provide significant
stimulus.

Let us examine these in detail. Her view on the financial market channel is really rather extraordinary, so let us take a look in more detail. The emphasis is mine.

For example, estimates from the Bank’s suite of models suggest that financial market channels – operating via the exchange rate, firms’ cost of capital and households’
financial wealth – account for a third to two thirds of the total medium-term impact on output from Bank Rate
changes, and a half to three quarters of the impact on inflation.

Yes we are back to wealth effects again with no addressing of the issuing for younger people of how they will have to buy more expensive assets is inflation for them.We look at this usually in terms of housing. Also if firms cost of capital responded to Bank Rate in the manner hinted at we would not have had the Funding for Lending and Term Funding Schemes. 

Next is the issue of corporate deposit rates which “may” stimulate corporate spending. Well after the years of evidence now about the impact of negative interest-rates in the Euro area then if you can only say “may” it means the answer is no. Although Silvana keeps plugging away at this.

This suggests one aspect of the banking channel of negative rates which could be more powerful than usual.

How bank lending can be both “looser” and “somewhat constrained” speaks for itself so I will leave that there.

Next comes the issue of the banks. The issue her is one of profitability or rather lack of. Her Silvana finds herself trapped between her theories and real world examples where people are backing their views with their money.

Interestingly, a number of studies48 – though not all49 – find that bank equities tend to fall after policy rate
cuts below zero are announced. That seems at odds with the more sanguine results on bank profitability.

Revealingly she decides that she is right and they are wrong.

One interpretation is that financial markets initially focussed on net interest income, but did not initially
account for the indirect boost to profits from negative rates arising from improvements in other sources of
income.

Indeed they have been wrong for quite some time according to her. It would be too cruel to look at the Italian banking sector so let us go to the benchmark for the Euro area banking sector which is Deutsche Bank. Back in 2015 there were two occasions when its share price approached 29 Euros whereas now it is 9.57 Euros. If we take out the Covid-19 pandemic then we see it does not change much as in February last year it was 10.2 Euros. So the share price has plunged over the era of negative interest-rates and bond yields because markets have failed for over five years to spot the “improvements in other sources of income.” Come to think of it the accountants and auditors have missed it as well!

We seem to be entering something of an alternative universe here.

And I have previously highlighted that in the UK interest rates affect inflation more quickly than in the past.

The ECB in fact published some work a few years back suggesting the reverse. I can only think that Silvana has misunderstood what happened in the summer of 2016.

Also we already have negative UK bond yields in the UK at the shorter maturities mostly due to all the QE bond buying she does not think is that important.Meanwhile that influences the increasing number of fixed-rate mortgages. On that road Bank Rate is ever less important which she seems to miss.

Comment

There are several contexts here so let me set out my view. There is a clear asymmetry between how central bankers regard interest-rate rises and cuts. The former are a vague wish and the latter are a clear desire often implemented via panic. Indeed interest-rate rises are often reversed ( the UK is an example of this ) and the new scenario is lower. For example the Bank of England told us the “lower bound” for UK interest-rates was 0.5% whereas Bank Rate is presently 0.1%. In a sane world we would be projecting interest-rate increases but in the insane one we inhabit any further economic weakness will see more cuts.

Next comes the issue of negative interest-rates which so far have been singing along with Muse.

Super massive black hole
Super massive black hole
Super massive black hole
(Super massive black hole)

The main place that has implemented them which is the Euro area is still there. In fact last year it cut again, although contrary to the Tenreyro rhetoric it only cut by 0.1% showing it sees risks. If negative rates had the impact claimed surely things would have got better and interest-rates could have been raised or at least returned to zero? The Riksbank in Sweden has raised back to 0% but that only illustrates the issue. It cut into negative territory in a boom and ended up so unsure about it all that it raised interest-rates in a bust. If they worked surely Sweden would have them now?

 

Another hint of negative interest-rates from the Bank of England

The weekend just gone has provided another step or two in the dance being played out by the Bank of England on negative interest-rates. It was provided by external member Silvana Tenreyro in an interview published by The Telegraph on Saturday night. Perhaps she was unaware she was giving an interview to a media organisation with a paywall but this continued a poor recent trend of Bank of England policymakers making some more equal than others. As a recipient of a public salary interviews like this should be available to all and not some but it is not on the Bank of England website.

As to her views they were really rather extraordinary so let us investigate.

LONDON (Reuters) – The Bank of England’s investigation into whether negative rates might help the British economy through its current downturn has found “encouraging” evidence, policymaker Silvana Tenreyro said in an interview published late on Saturday.

It is not the fact that she may well vote for negative interest-rates that is a surprise as after all she told us this back on the 15th of July.

In June I therefore voted with the majority of the MPC to increase our stock of asset purchases. Lower gilt
yields and higher asset prices induced by QE will lead to some aggregate demand stimulus, although the low
prevailing level of the yield curve may reduce the impact somewhat, relative to some of the MPC’s previous
asset purchase announcements. As with the rest of the committee, I remain ready to vote for further action
as necessary to support the economy and ensure inflation returns to target.

So she voted for more QE ( Quantitative Easing ) bond purchases in spite of the fact that she felt the extra £100 billion would have a weaker impact than previous tranches. This means that with UK bond or Gilt yields continuing to be low and in some cases negative ( out to around 6/7 years in terms of maturity) then in any downturn that only really leaves lower interest-rates. As they are already a mere 0.1% that means a standard move of 0.25% would leave us at -0.15%

Something Extraordinary

I am pocking this out as even from a central bank Ivory Tower it is quite something.

Tenreyro said evidence from the euro zone and Japan showed that cutting interest rates below zero had succeeded in reducing companies’ borrowing costs and did not make it unprofitable for banks to lend.

Let me start with the latter point which is about it being profitable for banks to lend in a time of negative interest-rates. This is news to ECB Vice-President De Guindos who told us this last November.

Let me start with euro area banks, which have been reporting persistently low profitability in recent years. The aggregate return on equity of the sector slightly declined to less than 6% in the 12 months to June 2019. This weak performance is broad-based, with around 75% of significant banks generating returns below the 8% benchmark return demanded by investors for holding bank equity.

He went further that day and the emphasis is mine

The recent softening of the macroeconomic growth outlook and the associated low-for-longer interest rate environment are likely to weigh further on their profitability prospects. Many market analysts are concerned about the drag on bank profitability that could result from the negative impact of monetary policy accommodation on net interest margins. And net interest margins are indeed under pressure.

If we fast forward to last week there is this from Peter Bookvar on Twitter.

A chart of the Euro STOXX bank stock index. Record low. Please stop calling central bank policy ‘stimulus.’ It is ‘restrictive’ if it kills off profitability of banks.

Or there was this.

PARIS (Reuters) – Societe Generale (PA:SOGN) is considering merging its two French retail networks in an attempt to boost profitability, after two consecutive quarterly losses due to poor trading results.

We do not often look at the French banks who have mostly moved under the radar but there is “trouble,trouble,trouble” ( h/t Taylor Swift) here too.

Shares in SocGen were up 1.2% to 11.9 euros at 0843 GMT, just above their lowest level in 27 years of 11.3 euros, after it said the review would be completed by the end of November.

So profitability is fine but share prices have collapsed? I guess Silvana must have an equity portfolio full of banks waiting for her triumph. Remember the ECB is presently throwing money at the banks by offering them money at -1% in an attempt to offset the problems created by negative interest-rates.

Another way of looking at bank stress was the surge in access to the US Federal Reserve Dollar liquidity swaps post March 19th. We saw the ECB and Bank of Japan leading the charge on behalf of banks in their jurisdictions. Intermediaries were unwilling to lend US Dollars to them as they feared they were in trouble which again contradicts our Silvana.

As to companies borrowing costs they have fallen although there have been other factors at play. For example the bond purchases of the ECB will have implictly helped bu lowering yields and making corporate bonds more attractive. Also it has bought 233 billion Euros of corporate bonds which in itself suggests more was felt to be needed. Actually some 289 billion Euros of bank covered bonds have been bought which returns us to The Precious! The Precious!

Tractor Production is rising

Apparently all of that means this.

“The evidence has been encouraging,” she said, adding that cuts in interest rates below zero had been almost fully reflected in reductions in interest rates charged to borrowers.

“Banks adapted well – their profitability increased with negative rates largely because impairments and loss provisions have decreased with the boost to activity and the increase in asset prices,” she said.

This really is the banking equivalent of Comical Ali or in football terms like saying Chelsea have a secure defence.

Comment

The picture here is getting ever more fuzzy. I have no issue with policymakers having different views and in fact welcome it. But I do have an issue with claims that are simply rubbish like the Silvana Tenreyro one that bank profitability has not been affected by negative interest-rates. Even one of her colleagues is correcting what is simply a matter of fact.

BOE’S RAMSDEN: ENGAGEMENT WITH BANKS ON NEGATIVE RATES WILL TAKE TIME……….BOE’S RAMSDEN: RATES ON RETAIL DEPOSITS TEND NOT TO FALL BELOW ZERO WHICH IS RELEVANT IN UK CONTEXT AFTER RING-FENCING…….BOE’S RAMSDEN: I SEE THE EFFECTIVE LOWER BOUND STILL AT 0.1%. ( @FinancialJuice)

However as is often the way with central banks he seems to be clinging to a theory that died over a decade ago.

BOE’S RAMSDEN: I STILL THINK THERE IS LIFE IN THE PHILLIPS CURVE, THE SLOPE MAY HAVE FLATTENED.

Later we will hear from Governor Bailey who only last week was trying to end the negative interest-rate rumours that he had begun. Oh Well!

Still there is one thing we can all agree on.

BOE’S RAMSDEN: THE BURDEN OF PROOF FOR ANY FUTURE RISE IN INTEREST RATES WILL BE HIGH.

Too high…..

Continuing a theme of agreement let me support one part of the Tenreyro interview.

“Flare-ups like we’re seeing may potentially lead to more localised lockdowns and will keep interrupting that V(-shaped recovery).”

Meanwhile these  days the main player are  bond yields making the official rate ever less important. Why? The vast majority of new mortgages are at fixed interest-rates and with fiscal policy being deployed on such a scale they matter directly.

Podcast

We are facing both inflation and disinflation at once

Before we even get to the issue of inflation data we have been provided an international perspective from China Statistics.

According to the preliminary estimates, the gross domestic product (GDP) of China was 20,650.4 billion yuan in the first quarter of 2020, a year-on-year decrease of 6.8 percent at comparable prices.

This provides several perspectives. Firstly there is clear deflation there and as this gets confused let me be clear that it is a fall in aggregate demand and whether you believe the China data or not there has clearly been a large fall. That is likely to have disinflationary influences but is not necessary the same thing as many assume.

After all China has had an area where the heat is on as Glenn Frey would say for some time.

pork up by 122.5 percent, specifically, its prices went up by 116.4 percent in March, 18.8 percentage points lower than February.

This contributed to this.

Grouped by commodity categories, prices for food, tobacco and alcohol went up by 14.9 percent year on year;

Vegetable prices were up by 9% too adding to the food inflation and this led to the Chinese being poorer overall.

In March, the consumer price went up by 4.3 percent…….In the first quarter, the nationwide per capita disposable income of residents was 8,561 yuan, a nominal increase of 0.8 percent year on year, or a real decrease of 3.9 percent after deducting price factors.

Regular readers will be aware that a feature of my work is to look at the impact of inflation on the ordinary worker and consumer as opposed to central bankers who love to torture the numbers to get the answer they wanted all along. An example of this is the use of core inflation which excludes two of the most vital components which are food and energy. Also if you use the European measure called CPI in the UK you miss a dair bit of shelter as well as owner-occupied housing is ignored.

The Bank of England

One of its policymakers Silvana Tenreyro was drumming a familiar beat yesterday.

During Covid-19, large, temporary changes in relative prices and consumption expenditure shares will make inflation data difficult to interpret.

Many of you are no doubt thinking that higher prices will be “looked through” and falls will led to some form of a central banking war dance. In an accident of timing we were updated on this subject by the Office for National Statistics yesterday as well.

Prices for the HDP basket increased by 1.8% from 30 March to 5 April (week 3) to 6 April to 12 April (week 4) with prices for all long-life food items decreasing by 1.5% and all household and hygiene items increasing by 1.1%.

At a more detailed level, prices for pet food and rice rose by 8.4% and 5.8% respectively, while prices of pasta sauce fell by 4.5% (note that the size of the sample means that sometimes single retailers can contribute to substantial movements at the item level).

Firstly let me welcome this new initiative from the ONS which in fact is likely to be too low as to be fair even they admit. If you look at the Statsusernet website I have made some suggestions but for now let me point out that something were prices are likely to have shot up ( face masks) have been dropped. The overall picture is as below.

Movements in the all HDP items index show a stable increase over time, with an increase of 4.4% since week 1. Pet food has a high weight in the all HDP items basket and is one of the main drivers of this change.

Up is the new down

Silvana seems to be heading in another direction though.

.Current policy actions will help counterbalance some of
this underlying weakness in inflation.

If she was aware of the numbers above maybe she has a sense of humour. Sadly we then get an outright misrepresentation.

Low and stable inflation is an essential pre-requisite for longer-term economic prosperity.

For example the Industrial Revolution must have seen quite large disinflation and in modern times areas of technology have seen enormous advances and price falls. This next bit is wrong too.

And it allows households, businesses and governments to finance their spending without introducing inflation risk premia to their borrowing costs.

If the inflation target of 2% per annum is hit as is her claimed objective then that is a clear inflation risk premium that needs to be paid. We are back to the central banking fantasy that 2% per annum is of significance rather than plucked out of thin air because it seemed right.

Indeed she continues in the same vein.

Our recent policy decisions will help ensure price stability by mitigating any deflationary pressures arising
from recent events.

Just for clarity central bankers merge both deflationary and disinflationary pressures and as she says there has already been a policy response.

The MPC’s policy actions have involved reducing Bank Rate from 0.75% to 0.1%, introducing a Term
Funding scheme with additional incentives for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (TFSME) and increasing
the size of our asset purchase programme, or quantitative easing, by £200 billion.

That gets awkward when she shifts to agreeing with me about inflation trends..

The exact effect of these issues, or even the sign of their effect, is going to be difficult to gauge.

Why? Again we are in agreement.

The key conceptual challenge is that there have been large shifts in spending patterns, which will change the
representative household consumption basket. Spending on social consumption has stopped almost
completely, for example, while spending on essentials from supermarkets has increased markedly.

Then she is in agreement again.

There are also likely to be considerable shifts in the prices of some goods still in high demand relative to
those no longer being purchased

Trouble is she had already acted.

Disinflation

A clear sign of a disinflationary trend is the price of crude oil. There are all sorts of issues with measuring it but according to oilprice.com the WTI benchmark is around US $25 and Brent Crude around US $28. Both have more than halved compared to this time last year.

Silvana looks at this with relation to labour costs and maybe my influence is beginning to spead as she wonders about the numbers.

While not mismeasurement per se, measured
productivity growth has been stronger in consumer goods producing sectors than in aggregate. Thinking
about how the consumption basket relates to inflation behaviour may be crucial over the coming years, given
the vast changes we are currently seeing in spending patterns.

We diverge on the fact that I think there has been mismeasurement.

As to the weakness in commercial rents I think most of you can figure that one out merely be looking at your local high street.

There are a range of possible explanations for the weakness in rent inflation over the past few years.

Comment

Let me welcome a Bank of England policymaker actually looking at inflation developments and doing some thinking. But as an external member I think one should be going further. For example I know she is looking mostly at commercial rents but there have been similar issues with ordinary rents but where is the challenge to these numbers being foisted on the owner-occupied housing sector. Or indeed the attempt to gerrymander the inflation data by replacing house prices and mortgage rates with Imputed Rents in the Retail Prices Index?

The UK Statistics Authority (the Authority) and HM Treasury are jointly consulting on reforming the methodology of the Retail Prices Index (RPI).

If you like it will be a case of one inflation measure to rule them all and in the darkness bind them. At least the consultation has now been extended until August as believe it or not they were hoping to get away with running it during the lockdown. As to the changes let me hand you over to the RPI-CPI User Group of the Royal Statistical Society.

1. The UKSA is consulting on how to splice the RPI and CPIH together – effectively replacing RPI with CPIH, but retaining the name RPI.
2. The Treasury is consulting on when (between 2025 and 2030) this change should take place.
Importantly, neither is consulting on whether this change should be made.

Looking ahead we will see pockets of inflation in for example medical areas and as some are reporting essential goods too. Or rather what are called non-core by central bankers and Ivory Towers.

My usual essential shopping has cost between £32 – £38 for months, now jumped to £42 – £48. Inflation, the quiet poverty maker. ( @KeithCameron5 )

In other areas like fuel costs we will see disinflation. But further ahead as we see production of some items brought back to domestic industry we are likely to see higher prices. So our central bankers have abandoned inflation targeting if you look several years ahead as they are supposed to.

 

 

 

UK house prices rose by 5.9% in February according to the Halifax

This morning has brought news that is like a ray of sunshine to Bank of England Governor Mark Carney. Indeed I am told he keeps checking if the sun has gone over the yardarm. From Reuters.

British house prices jumped in February, rising by 5.9 percent from January, mortgage lender Nationwide said on Thursday.

In annual terms, prices were up by 2.8 percent in the three months to February, the lender said.

A Reuters poll of economists had pointed to a 0.1 percent increase on the month and a 1.0 percent annual rise in prices.

Halifax’s index has tended to be more volatile than other measures of house prices of late.

Actually if you crunch the numbers UK house prices were 5.3% higher in February than in February 2018. So any junior at the Bank of England spotting this and telling the Governor will go straight on the fact-track promotion scheme. In case you are wondering why there is a difference between that and the number reported it is because the Halifax uses quarterly and not monthly numbers for annual growth.

In the latest quarter (December – February) house prices were 1.8% higher than in the preceding three months (September – November).

As we break the numbers down we see that there is a clear issue with monthly volatility with the last four months showing growth of -1.2%,2.5%,-3% and now 5.9%.So the series has increasingly placed itself in question.

Maybe they have been looking at Fulham which for some reason has seen quite a pick up in activity recently although care is needed as it saw drops this time last year.I also note that some of you have been pointing out a bit of a boom in the Midlands. Perhaps the Halifax only went to these two areas in February but however you try to spin it this months number reduces the credibility of the series.

Actually it also has rather caught out Silvana Tenreyro of the Bank of England who has not been keeping up with current events.

And official UK house price growth has also fallen, from an annual rate of 8% in mid-2016 to below
3% in the latest data. The growth rate of the Nationwide house price index, a timelier indicator, has fallen
further still.

Tenreyro

She sort of backs the Bank of England party line as she says “I agree with Mark” with little apparent enthusiasm.

So while I still envisage that in the event of a smooth Brexit we will need a small amount of tightening over
the next three years, before voting for any rate rises I would want to be confident that demand was growing
faster than supply.

She also repeats the Bank of England standard that whilst they are giving us Forward Guidance of higher interest-rates in fact interest-rates may go up or down.

As the MPC has long emphasised, the monetary policy response to such a scenario will depend on the
balance of these effects on supply, demand and the exchange rate. In my judgement, a situation where the
negative demand effects outweigh those other effects is more likely, which would necessitate a loosening in
policy. But it is easy to envisage other plausible scenarios requiring the opposite response.

Although as no doubt many of you have already spotted she seems to have “a loosening in policy” in mind. Also she does seem rather obsessed with one subject.

And however Brexit affects the economy, my monetary
policy decisions will continue to be framed by the MPC’s remit.

As to the more technical details after more than a few assumptions she thinks she has detected a rise in productivity growth.

More sophisticated statistical filtering
methods tell a similar story to these simple averages, with the trend of four-quarter productivity growth
picking up gradually from 0.1% in 2012 to 0.7% in 2018 when using the backcast data.

I would just warn that the accuracy of the numbers here may not be enough to support such filtering. Also her view that these numbers tend to be revised higher is not having a good morning as Eurostat has just revised Euro area GDP growth for the autumn of this year down from 0.2% to 0.1%

Saunders

Michael has discovered something which I first reported on here nearly ten-years ago.

Since late 2017, the MPC has increased the policy rate by 50bp, in two 25bp steps. Consistent with MPC
guidance, the rise in the policy rate has been gradual and limited……………However, pass-through to retail interest rates – both deposit rates and lending rates – has been unusually small. Many household interest rates have barely changed.

Actually it is the reason why QE was introduced because policymakers thought that the large cuts in Bank Rate would do the trick but found that some interest-rates did move but others did not. Actually some rose as I recall credit card interest-rates rising from circa 17% to more like 19%. So it is nice to see Michael catching up with reality. Some of you may already be experiencing a version of this which is far from unexpected here.

It is a similar story for rates on new household time deposits: a rise of 15bp so far (roughly 30% of
the rise in Bank Rate), versus average pass-through of just above 100% in prior MPC hiking cycles.

It seems that those looking for deposits and savings have little or no faith in the Forward Guidance of the Bank of England. Also it pumped them full of liquidity with the latest version of that being the Term Funding Scheme and if we add up such schemes they are still providing some £137 billion of liquidity. Or to put it another way that means that banks and building societies have much less need to compete for deposits. It also directly leads into this.

The average rate on new mortgages (covering both fixed and variable rate loans) is up by only 10-15bp, roughly 30% of the rise in the appropriate mix of Bank Rate and swap rates.

Brighter members at the Bank of England will consider that to be quite a triumph.

Frankly the section on higher interest-rates just seems like hot air.

In that scenario, further UK monetary tightening – limited and gradual – probably will be needed over time.

Okay but not now ( unlike when they wanted to cut which was immediate)

However, the possibility that monetary tightening might be needed in the future does not necessarily mean
we need to tighten now

You may have noted how quickly the rises went from probable to possible and we quickly see they may vanish in a puff of smoke.

And as we have said before, the monetary
policy response to Brexit, whatever form it takes, will not be automatic and could be in either direction.

Comment

The farce that is Forward Guidance is a saga that no-one seems able to stop. Supposedly individuals and businesses are being helped in their planning by being informed of what the Bank of England intends to do with interest-rates. The most obvious problem is that when there was a response from the ordinary person via a higher uptake in fixed-rate mortgages the Bank of England then cut interest-rates in a sharp about turn. I never really imagined many would follow this outside of financial markets but that must have cut the number even further.

As to house prices we are reminded of the flawed nature of many of the indices which measure them by today’s extraordinary number from the Halifax.

The Investing Channel

 

 

 

The Bank of England seems determined to ignore the higher oil price

This morning has brought the policies of the Bank of England into focus as this from the BBC demonstrates.

Petrol prices rose by 6p a litre in May – the biggest monthly increase since the RAC began tracking prices 18 years ago.

Average petrol prices hit 129.4p a litre, while average diesel prices also rose by 6p to 132.3p a litre.

The RAC said a “punitive combination” of higher crude oil prices and a weaker pound was to blame for the increases.

It pointed out that oil prices broke through the $80-a-barrel mark twice in May – a three-and-a-half year high.

As well as the higher global market price of crude, the pound’s current weakness against the US dollar also makes petrol more expensive as oil is traded in dollars.

There is little or nothing that could have been done about the rising price of crude oil but there is something that could have been done about the “pound’s current weakness against the US dollar”. In fact it is worse than that if we look back to April 20th.

The governor of the Bank of England has said that an interest rate rise is “likely” this year, but any increases will be gradual.

This was quite an unreliable boyfriend style reversal on the previous forward guidance towards a Bank Rate rise in May that the Financial Times thought was something of a triumph. But the crucial point here is that the UK Pound £ was US $1.42 the day before Mark Carney spoke as opposed to US $1.33. Some of that is the result of what we call the King Dollar but Governor Carney gave things a shove. After all we used to move with the US Dollar much more than we have partly because our monetary policy was more aligned with its. Or to be precise only cuts in interest-rates seem likely to be aligned with the US under the stewardship of Governor Carney.

Just as a reminder UK inflation remains above target where it has been for a while.

The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) 12-month rate was 2.4% in April 2018, down from 2.5% in March 2018.

The welcome fall in inflation due to the rally in the UK Pound £ has been torpedoed by the unreliable boyfriend and a specific example of this is shown below.

Let us give the BBC some credit for releasing those although the analysis by its economics editor Kamal Ahmed ignores the role of the Bank of England.

Silvana Tenreyro

Silvana in case you are unaware is a member of the Monetary Policy Committee who gave a speech at the University of Surrey yesterday evening. As you can imagine at a time of rising inflation concerns she got straight to what she considers to be important.

Many critics have laid the blame on the tools that economists use – our models.So, in my speech today, I
will attempt to shed some light on how and why economists use models. Specifically, I will focus on how they
are useful to me as a practitioner on the MPC

Things do not start well because in my life whilst there has been a change from paper based maps to the era of Google Maps they have proved both useful and reliable unlike economic models.

An oft-used analogy is to think of models as maps

Perhaps Silvana gets regularly lost. She certainly seems lost at sea here.

Similarly, economic models have improved with greater
computing power, econometric techniques and data availability, but there is still significant uncertainty that
cannot be eliminated.

Let me add to this with an issue we have regularly looked at on here which is the Phillips Curve and associated “output gap” style analysis.

Many commentators have recently argued that the Phillips curve is no longer apparent in the data – the
observed correlation between inflation and slack is much weaker than it has been in the past. If the Phillips
curve truly has flattened or disappeared, then the current strength of the UK labour market may be less likely
to translate into a pick-up in domestic inflationary pressures. Given that the Phillips curve is one of the
building blocks of standard macroeconomic models, including those used by the MPC, a breakdown in the
relationship would also call for a reassessment.

Er no I have been arguing this since about 2010/11 as the evidence began that it was not working in the real world. However Silvana prefers the safe cosy world of her Ivory Tower.

My view is that these fears are largely misplaced. I expect that the narrowing in labour market slack we have
seen over the past year will lead to greater inflationary pressures, as in our standard models.

The fundamental problem is that the Bank of England has told us this for year after year now. One year they may even be right and no doubt there will be an attempt to redact the many years of errors and being wrong but we are now at a stage where the whole theory is flawed even if it now gets a year correct. As we stand with four months in a row of falling total pay in the UK the outlook for the Phillips Curve is yet again poor. Here is how Silvana tells us about this.

Although average weekly earnings (AWE) growth has now been strengthening since the middle of 2017,

Inflation

Fortunately on her way to the apparently important work of explaining to us of how up is the new down regarding economic models Silvana does refer to her views on inflation.

such as energy costs. And indeed, Chart 2 shows that the contribution of the purple bars to inflation
is correlated with the peaks and troughs of oil-price inflation over the past decade or so

It is probably because her mind is on other matters that she has given us a presumably unintentional rather devastating critique of the central bankers obsession with core inflation which of course ignores exactly that ( and food). Mind you it does not take her long to forget this.

Since the effects of oil-price swings are transitory, there is a good case for ‘looking through’ their impact on inflation.

Oh and those who recall my critique of the Bank of England models on the subject of the impact of the post EU leave vote will permit me a smile as I note this.

But in the past few quarters, we have seen some
building evidence that import prices have been rising slightly less than we had expected (only by around half
of the increase in foreign export prices – Chart 3). For me, this may be one reason why CPI inflation has
recently fallen back faster than we had expected.

I have no idea why they thought this and argued against it correctly as even they now admit. This is of course especially awkward in the middle of a speech designed to boost the economic models that have just been wrong yet again!

Comment

If we move to the policy prescription the outlook is not good for someone who has just dismissed the recent rise in the oil price as only likely to have a “transitory” effect. In fact as we move forwards we get the same vacuous waffle.

While I anticipate that a few rate rises will be needed, the timing of those rate rises is an open question

Okay but when?

With falling imported inflation offset by a gradual pick-up in domestic costs, I judge that conditional on the
outlook I have just described, a gradual tightening in monetary policy will be necessary over the next three
years to return inflation to target and keep demand growing broadly in line with supply.

So not anytime soon!

The flexibility is limited, however – waiting a few more
quarters increases the likelihood that inflation overshoots the target. In May, I felt that as in these scenarios, the costs of waiting a short period of time for more information were
small.

So more of the same although let me give Silvana a little credit as she was willing to point out that Forward Guidance is a farce.

Taken literally, the models suggest implausibly large economic effects from promises about interest rates many years in the future. There is ample empirical evidence that these strong assumptions do not hold in real-world data.

Also she does seem willing to accept that the world is a disaggregated place full of different impacts on different individuals.

Another unrealistic assumption in many macroeconomic models is that everyone is the same. Or more
accurately, that everyone can be characterised by a single, representative household or firm.